JODL: No, everything remained behind.
DR. EXNER: Was there any hesitation among the political leaders at the last moment?
JODL: On 11 March, in the afternoon, I had news from the Reich Chancellery that the Wehrmacht was not to move in, but that the Police would pass through the Wehrmacht and move in alone. In the evening, however, on 11 March, at 2030 hours, the final decision reached me, which was that the Wehrmacht was to move in after all. I was unable to find out the reason for that hesitation.
DR. EXNER: So that altogether there was not really an invasion by force?
JODL: No, it was a purely peaceful occupation. It was characterized by my suggestion to the chief of the operations department of the Army that he should have bands marching at the head of the columns and that all drivers should be sure to wear goggles, otherwise they might be blinded by the flowers thrown at them.
DR. EXNER: What was the significance of the order you signed regarding the march into Austria? It has been put before you under Document Number C-182, Exhibit USA-77. You remember it, do you not?
JODL: Yes, I remember. That is nothing other than the written record of something which had previously been ordered orally and which was already being carried out. That written order, you see, would have come much too late.
DR. EXNER: And what is the significance of Document C-103, Exhibit USA-75, referring to a possible clash with Czech troops or Italian troops on Austrian territory? How did you come to that?
JODL: That was based on an inquiry from the General Staff of the Army. They wanted to know, even in the case of the remotest eventuality, how the troops were to comport themselves. I clarified the matter over the telephone, through General Schmundt, with the Führer, and I then put his decision down in writing, by his order.
DR. EXNER: And how did the operation come off?