DR. EXNER: That is Document L-52, Exhibit USA-540. It is printed on Page 48, Volume I, of my document book.
In this memorandum—for whom was the memorandum prepared?
JODL: This memorandum, as I think is obvious from the document, went out to the three Commanders-in-Chief and to the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. It was dictated word for word by the Führer himself and was completed in 2 nights.
DR. EXNER: I shall read Paragraph 2, printed on Page 48 of my document book:
“The Nordic States.
“Their neutrality, provided no completely unforeseen circumstances arise, may be assumed also for the future. The continuation of German trade with these countries appears possible, even if the war is of long duration.”
JODL: It is quite out of the question that the Führer, in this extremely secret memorandum, could have mentioned anything but his true purpose at that particular time. That, however, is all the more comprehensible since it was not until 1 day later, namely 10 October, that Grossadmiral Raeder first mentioned these fears to the Führer.
DR. EXNER: Was the occupation of Norway a very weighty decision for the leadership?
JODL: It was a terribly weighty decision. To put it shortly—it meant gambling with the entire German fleet. The result of it was that we had to defend a coastline of over 3,000 kilometers, and that meant that nearly 300,000 men were lying idle there. The decision, therefore, depended on really reliable information that Norway was threatened by actual danger. That is the reason why no definite date was fixed for this operation “Weserübung,” and the reason why I at a later date suggested that the forces for the Norway operation, in case it became necessary, and for an attack in the West, should be completely separate from each other.
DR. EXNER: What were the reasons why the occupation had to be prepared in every detail?