DR. EXNER: We shall hear him as a witness.
Did you check the entries made in that official diary, or did you not?
JODL: I usually did not have the time; but if General Scherff read through it and discovered anything in particular he would draw my attention to it.
DR. EXNER: Well, so much for clearing that up.
We now come back to the Balkan question again. It says in your so-called diary, “The Balkans should and must remain quiet.” What was meant by that?
JODL: That was a brief note on the statement by the Führer—namely, that he was in perfect agreement with Mussolini that the Balkans must be kept quiet.
DR. EXNER: And did we not actually try to keep the Balkan states as quiet as possible?
JODL: Yes. We made unremitting endeavors for that. Our attitude toward Yugoslavia was as considerate as if we were dealing with a prima donna. Matters went so far that when we had to prepare the Greek campaign the Führer even refused a proposal from the Quartermaster General of the Army that sealed trains—the supply trains—should be sent through Yugoslavia, which would have been permissible according to international law. Moreover, we brought pressure to bear on Bulgaria so that she should not participate in the impending campaign against Greece, above all so as not to alarm Turkey. And even after the Greco-Italian campaign, the Führer still hoped that a conflict, an actual war, between Germany and Greece could be avoided.
DR. EXNER: I refer here to Directive Number 18, printed on Page 66 of Volume I of our document book, which contains an extract from Document 444-PS, Exhibit GB-116, and here we find the following statement in the paragraph before the last:
“The preparatory measures of the High Command for the conduct of the war in the near future are to be made in accordance with the following guiding principles...”