JODL: Instructions such as these to Canaris’ office were issued by me every 6 weeks. They formed the basis for the so-called counterespionage work, which I do not wish to discuss in detail here. In this case what matters to me was that the weak forces which we kept in the East at this time should be made to appear actually stronger. That, for instance, can be clearly seen from Paragraph 3 which says, and I quote:
“In statements on the equipment situation of the forces, especially of the armored divisions, it is advisable to exaggerate if necessary.”
I also pointed out in the next paragraph that antiaircraft defenses should be exaggerated. All this was done because at that time anxiety had already arisen that possibly a Russian operation against Romania might develop. The purpose of this order was to deter them from that, and it was intended for the intelligence only. If on 6 September, I had already known of any aggressive intention against Russia I would have said exactly the contrary; for with this order, as I had issued it, I would have been working in the interests of Gisevius and his friends—namely, I would have been informing the Russians that we were beginning to deploy our troops.
DR. EXNER: Now, when did you first hear of the Führer’s fears that Russia might prove hostile to us?
JODL: For the first time, on 29 July 1940, at the Berghof near Berchtesgaden.
DR. EXNER: In what connection?
JODL: The Führer kept me back alone after a discussion on the situation and said to me, most unexpectedly, that he was worried that Russia might occupy still more territory in Romania before the winter and that the Romanian oil region, which was the conditio sine qua non for our war strategy, would thus be taken from us. He asked me whether we could not deploy our troops immediately, so that we would be ready by autumn to oppose with strong forces any such Russian intention. These are almost the exact words which he used, and all other versions are false.
DR. EXNER: You have just mentioned Hitler’s concern about the seizure of the Romanian oil fields. Did the Führer do anything on account of this apprehension?
JODL: It was precisely on the basis of this conversation—when I protested that it was quite impossible to carry out a troop deployment at that time for it would take 4 months—that the Führer ordered that these deployment arrangements were to be improved. Two orders were then issued immediately. One, I believe, is of 9 August. It was called “Reconstruction East” and included all measures to improve the deployment arrangements in the eastern area. The second order was issued on 27 August. We do not have it here, but it has been recorded in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff.
DR. EXNER: Yes, that is Page 85, Volume I of my document book. There is an entry, right at the end of the page, in the Diary of the Naval Operations Staff: