DR. EXNER: Did the reports which you received contain indications of military reinforcements for the Red Army?
JODL: From maps which were submitted every few days, which were based on intelligence reports and information from the radio interception section, the following picture was formed: In the summer of 1940 there were about 100 Russian divisions along the border. In January 1941, there were already 150 divisions; and these were indicated by number, consequently the reports were reliable. In comparison with this strength, I may add that the English-American-French forces operating from France against Germany never, to my knowledge, amounted to 100 divisions.
DR. EXNER: Did Hitler attempt to clear up the political situation by diplomatic means?
JODL: He attempted to do so by the well-known conference with Molotov; and I must say that I placed great hopes on this conference, for the military situation for us soldiers was as follows: With a definitely neutral Russia in our rear—a Russia which in addition sent us supplies—we could not lose the war. An invasion, such as took place on 6 June 1944, would have been entirely out of the question if we had had at our disposal all the forces we had used and lost in this immense struggle in Russia. And it never for a single moment entered my mind that a statesman, who after all was also a strategist, would needlessly let such an opportunity go. And it is a fact that he struggled for months with himself about this decision, being certainly influenced by the many contrary ideas suggested to him by the Reich Marshal, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, as well as the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
DR. EXNER: On the basis of the reports which you received, what did the further military situation on both sides look like?
JODL: The Intelligence Service was put to work as from January 1941. The divisions on our borders and also along the Romanian frontier grew rapidly. On 3 February 1941 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army informed the Führer of the operations which he himself intended to carry out. At the same time he presented a map showing the Russian troop deployment. This map indicated—and this has been proved by documents—that there were 100 infantry divisions, 25 cavalry divisions...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, do we need all these strategic details of plans which were drawn up by the German General Staff?
DR. EXNER: It is of very great importance to establish the picture facing the General Staff at that time. If an overwhelming concentration of Russian troops had not...
THE PRESIDENT: But that is not what he tells about. He is telling us about February 1941. The OKW had produced plans to show the deployment of German troops.
DR. EXNER: That is a plan which was developed by...