DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about Himmler’s attempt to set Hitler against the generals? When I say “generals” I mean the ones who are of the “group.”
JODL: I have perhaps already answered that in part when I complained that we were not in a position to prevent military reports and news of irresponsible sources from reaching the Führer. It was a standing rule that police circles particularly continually used the opportunity through Himmler to criticize the traditional, or—as they called it—the reactionary, humanitarian, chivalrous attitude of the higher military leaders, so that the severe orders of the Führer for brutal action—as he called it—might be stayed. This was a constant state of affairs. All of them were by no means involved and it was not directed against all the commanding generals, but it was against quite a few.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, you still have not quite answered my question. I asked you whether you knew anything about Himmler’s attempt to make Hitler hostile, for reasons which I hope you will tell me.
JODL: Well, the outcome of what I have just described was that Himmler went to the Führer and reported to him, privately of course. He complained about certain commanding generals, all of them of the Army; and we knew about it, because the following day the Führer suddenly began to raise some objections to some commanding general without our knowing why, and would cause bad feeling.
DR. LATERNSER: How were the relations between the OKW and the OKH?
JODL: Before the war and during the first part of the war the relationship between the High Command of the Armed Forces and the High Command of the Army was made difficult by considerable tension. The reason, however, was exclusively an internal military one. Because in the creation of the High Command of the Armed Forces a general staff group had come into being which was outside the jurisdiction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, and which was, I should say, even above the General Staff of the Army and gave orders to them. This constellation was, of course, regarded with a great deal of distrust by the General Staff of the Army. I might add, however, that Field Marshal Keitel and I, and many reasonable officers, succeeded in completely overcoming this tension as the war went on.
DR. LATERNSER: I think, Generaloberst, that that is enough on that point.
The military leaders are accused of having delayed the end of a hopeless war unnecessarily. What do you know about the efforts of Field Marshal Von Rundstedt and Rommel after the invasion had succeeded?
JODL: I remember a conference with these two commanding generals when the Führer and I flew to the headquarters which had been prepared north of Reims. That was about July 1944. During that conference, both Field Marshal Von Rundstedt and particularly Rommel described in an unmistakable manner the seriousness of the entire situation in France, characterized by the tremendous superiority of the Anglo-Saxon Air Force, against which ground operations were powerless. I remember quite clearly that Field Marshal Rommel asked the Führer at the end, “My Führer, what do you really think about the further development of the war?” The Führer was rather angry at this remark, and he answered curtly, “That is a question which is no part of your duty. You will have to leave that to me.”
DR. LATERNSER: Did you read the letter which Field Marshal Von Kluge wrote to Hitler shortly before he died?