DR. LATERNSER: The Secret Field Police were actually a part of the division, were they not?

JODL: Yes, they were divisional troops which carried out police work among the troops. Then came the rear area of the armies which was under the commanding generals of the armies, and behind that were the lines of communication of the Army which comprised all the supply units and services of the Quartermaster General of the Army. In this main sector—which was by far the largest sector as it comprised 97 percent of the entire operational area—the entire Police and everything which did not belong to the Army organically was not under the command of the Army, as far as tasks were concerned, but under the Police, under the Reichsführer SS Himmler. Only from the standpoint of servicing the troops—that is, with regard to their supplies or movements during advance or retreat—did the Army, of course, have the right to give orders to the troops regarding their movements and their accommodation.

DR. LATERNSER: Schellenberg states that in the rear operational areas and in the rear areas of the Army these special task groups came under the Army only as far as supplies were concerned; and as far as orders and tasks were concerned, under the Reich Security Main Office. Is that correct?

JODL: That is correct. The entire Police received orders about what they were to do from Himmler only.

DR. LATERNSER: Schellenberg also states further in his Affidavit Number 12, Document 3710-PS, Exhibit USA-557, that this subordination as regards troop servicing also included the question of discipline. Is that true?

JODL: That is wrong. An officer of the Army could never punish a member of the Police or the SS.

DR. LATERNSER: As has been established, the chief task of these special task groups was to carry out mass extermination of Jews and Communists. Schellenberg states in his Affidavit Number 12 that he was convinced that the commanding generals of the army groups and armies had been clearly informed of these tasks through official channels. Since Schellenberg has stated his conviction in this affidavit I ask you to give us yours, because I think I am right in assuming that you were with the best informed officers of the Armed Forces.

JODL: I cannot, of course, judge exactly what the commanding generals actually experienced while they were together at the front; but I can say with absolute certainty that I have never seen an order which revealed that these police units had been sent into the operational zone for any other purpose than that of maintaining quiet and order, from the police point of view, and uncovering revolts and partisan activities. I have never seen a report or an order which contained anything other than that.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you believe, Generaloberst, that the commanding generals of the armies or army groups would have tolerated those conditions without protest?

JODL: I consider that out of the question, because even in the case of much smaller incidents they raised the most violent protests. Hundreds of documents which have been offered by the Prosecution here show how the troops at the front had objected to measures which they considered inadmissible from a humane point of view or dangerous to peace and order in the occupied territories. I have only to remind you of Blaskowitz’ memorandum, which was one of the first.