JODL: From the beginning, in his orders for the attacks in the West, he had the intention to go through Belgium; but he had reservations with regard to Holland for a long time, which were only rescinded later—I believe in the middle of November. Regarding Holland his intentions were not specific. Regarding Belgium his intentions in that direction were known comparatively early, that is, about the middle or the early part of October.
MR. ROBERTS: You could not, of course—I mean Germany naturally wanted to wage an offensive war and an offensive war in somebody else’s country. That is the ambition, naturally, isn’t it?
JODL: The German objective in this war was to win, at that time.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. You couldn’t attack in the West unless you attacked through Belgium, could you?
JODL: In any event, any other attack was tremendously difficult and was highly doubtful. I have already said that.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. That is why, of course, France built the Maginot Line, so that you couldn’t attack her frontally.
Well, now, if you secured the coast of Belgium and Holland, you secured air bases from which you could annihilate England or Great Britain. That is what you hoped, wasn’t it?
JODL: No doubt the strategic position of Germany in the battle against England improved through our having the coast; that is true.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. May I just remind you of a few documents which the Tribunal know already. I do not intend to read them, but the first document in order of date is 375-PS, USA-84, dated 25 August 1938. It is during the Fall Grün time. That was the Air Force appreciation which, in the last paragraph of the document, Page 11, I think, it says:
“Belgium and the Netherlands in German hands would represent an extraordinary advantage in the air war against Great Britain....”