WINTER: The official reason, given to me at the time by my commander and my chief, was that an attack from Soviet Russia was to be expected shortly, and that this was therefore a preventive measure.
DR. JAHRREISS: And then you experienced the first battles on the frontier, did you not?
WINTER: Yes, in this staff.
DR. JAHRREISS: That was toward the south?
WINTER: It was in the Ukraine, Army Group South.
DR. JAHRREISS: Even after those first battles, you had a certain amount of experiences and certain impressions of the opponent, did you not?
WINTER: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Were they, General, such impressions as to confirm the official reason given, that of a preventive war?
WINTER: It was the uniform impression of the command of the army group—including the commander, the chief, and the operations department under my command—that the reason given for the campaign was the true one. Our own impression at the time was that we had hit on active preparations for an offensive campaign.
DR. JAHRREISS: But did you have the facts on which to base this impression?