First, that they represented a considerable danger. I recall the meeting of statesmen in Stresa and their resolutions against Germany. And even though we were never worried about Italy, one had nevertheless to realize that in this very troubled atmosphere anything could easily lead to war. We all agreed that the main task of German policy must be to avoid war.
DR. STEINBAUER: We are now in the year...
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to add that, with regard to domestic policy, the events on 25 July were the worst that could possibly have happened to the prospect of the Anschluss. We reflected on what might be done and came to the conclusion that the Party in the Reich should cease its interference in the Austrian National Socialist Party, the existence of which anticipated the Anschluss; but in return, the National Socialists in Austria should once more receive permission to be active, and especially, there should be elections to ascertain the proportional strength of the parties.
DR. STEINBAUER: What I am interested in is the question whether you had any connections with authorities in the Reich at that time, that is, in 1936?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had no connections with authorities in the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. Did you...
SEYSS-INQUART: Only, as Reich Marshal Göring has already testified, when I became a State Councillor, did I, for the first time, meet a leading German politician.
DR. STEINBAUER: When was that?
SEYSS-INQUART: That was in June or July 1937.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was your attitude toward the NSDAP in Austria at that time, when you were State Councillor?