SEYSS-INQUART: One cannot call it an invasion; it was a stormy, loudly cheered entry of German troops. There were no villages—even those with an orthodox Catholic population—and no workers’ districts which did not burst out in stormy jubilation. Moreover, both Dr. Schuschnigg and I were completely clear about this; once in 1937 he had agreed with me when I said that the entry of German troops into Austria could not be impeded by anything but the ovations of the population.

DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to a Document Number Seyss-Inquart-37, Page 86. This is a quotation from the book by Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision, describing a conversation between him and the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, and it says:

“Before the occupation of Austria, Dr. Schuschnigg came to Rome. He admitted to me frankly that, if Germany occupied Austria, the majority of Austrians would support the occupation and, if Italy sent troops into Austria to prevent the occupation, the Austrians as one man would join with the Germans to fight Italy.”

Now, Witness, we come to the next day, to 12 March. Did you not at that time have a telephone conversation with Hitler?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes; I called the Führer in connection with the entry of troops. I should like to repeat and explain that on the day before, at about 7 o’clock, the negotiations suddenly came to a stop. Everybody waited. At half past 7 State Secretary Skubl came with the news that the entry of German troops had actually begun, according to a report from one of the frontier posts; indeed Field Marshal Göring had repeatedly said that it would take place. Thinking that the entry was actually in progress, Schuschnigg then made his farewell speech. And with that the government of the Fatherland Front had resigned from office. And I state expressly, up to this moment I did nothing which in any way furthered the taking over of control in Austria or to express it more correctly, which intentionally furthered the establishment of the National Socialists and the seizure of power. I only acted as an intermediary within the meaning of the Treaty of 12 February. But from the moment when the system of the Fatherland Front came to an end, I considered it my responsibility to take action. First I made a radio speech, but not the one which had been prescribed for me in the morning. For I did not speak of a provisional government, but referred to myself as Minister of the Interior. Only then did I call on the SA and the SS to act as auxiliary police; and like Schuschnigg, I gave the order to offer no resistance to the entry of German troops. Subsequently I was appointed Federal Chancellor, and my Cabinet was approved. On the same night I drove Dr. Schuschnigg home in my car, because I was afraid something might happen to him at the hands of provocateurs; and I asked Dr. Keppler to call up the Führer and ask him not to give the order for the entry of troops. Reich Marshal Göring spoke about that here. In the morning I called up again; then I met the Führer at the airport in Linz, and, as the entry of the troops was in full progress, I asked him whether it would not be possible to have Austrian troops march into the German Reich, so that, symbolically at least, equal rights would be maintained. The Führer agreed; and Austrian troops actually marched into Munich, Berlin, and other cities, in Austrian uniform.

DR. STEINBAUER: How, in your capacity as newly appointed Federal Chancellor, did you envisage the further development of the situation?

SEYSS-INQUART: Since the system of the Fatherland Front had broken down, I could no longer entertain my idea of a coalition government. It was clear to me that a National Socialist government with a very strong Catholic tendency would control developments not in the form of an immediate Anschluss but rather—by carrying out appropriate elections and a plebiscite—in the form of an economic and possibly a military union with the German Reich.

DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, in this connection, I should like to submit an extremely important document, which shows in an entirely new way how the Anschluss Law came about. It is a sworn statement of the former State Secretary of the Interior, Dr. Stuckart, who is imprisoned here. I submit it to the Court and should like to establish the following from this testimony...

THE PRESIDENT: Where is the document?

DR. STEINBAUER: It is not in the document book because I received it later. The translation of it has not yet been completed. I will read from the witness’ testimony only briefly to establish the connection—I have submitted the original to the Court...