SEYSS-INQUART: The charge is also raised against me that I blew up safes. I opposed this most strongly. When such a case was reported to me, I had my prosecuting authority issue the indictment and the order for arrest.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I shall go on to the next question. How about the blowing up and destruction of ports, docks, locks, and mines in the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: Blastings were undertaken at the moment when the Netherlands again became a theater of war. As for port and dock installations and shipyards, the following is important: The port of Antwerp fell almost undamaged into the hands of the enemy. I believe that that was of decisive importance for the further development of the offensive. Thereupon the competent military authorities in the Netherlands began to blow up such installations as a precautionary measure. I am only acquainted with the fact, not with the details; and I refused to watch the explosions. But my commissioner and I intervened with the Armed Forces offices, and I believe that in Rotterdam half of the installations were not blown up. This is shown by the Dutch reports. I had nothing whatever to do with the matter, aside from this intervention.
When the English reached Limburg, an order was issued to blow up the mines as being vital for war. I inquired with Reich Minister Speer about this, and he issued an order not to blow them up but only to put them out of commission for 3 or 4 months. The orders were issued to this effect. I hope that they were not violated.
DR. STEINBAUER: We have heard in this Trial of “scorched earth” policy. Did that apply to the Netherlands also?
SEYSS-INQUART: I received a “scorched earth” order from Bormann. Without there being a military necessity for it, all technical installations were to be blown up. That meant, in effect, the destruction of Holland, that is, the western Netherlands. If explosions are carried out in 14 or 16 different places in Holland the country will be entirely flooded in 3 or 4 weeks. I did not carry out the order at first; instead I established contact with Reich Minister Speer. I had a personal meeting with him on 1 April in Oldenburg. Speer told me that the same order had been given in the Reich; but that he was frustrating it, that he now had full authority in this matter, and that he agreed that the order should not be carried out in the Netherlands. It was not carried out.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, to another chapter. Floods did occur. Did you have anything to do with them?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know about this, and in a certain connection I did have something to do with it.
There were previously prepared floodings by the Armed Forces for defense purposes and there were so-called “battle” floodings, which suddenly became necessary in the course of battle. The prepared ones were carried out in closest contact with my office and the Dutch offices. Through their intervention, about half of the area demanded was spared and saved. The flooding was done mostly with fresh water so that less damage would occur, and the outer dikes were spared. There were two battle floodings in Holland, at the order of the commander of Holland. The Wieringer Polder was mentioned in particular. At that time there was great danger of a troop landing from the air which would outflank the Dutch defense front. I was not actually informed of the execution of the battle floodings. The commander had decided on it overnight.
When, on 30 April, I talked to Lieutenant General Bedell Smith, General Eisenhower’s Chief of the General Staff, he told us: “What has been flooded so far can be justified from the military point of view; if you flood any more now, it is no longer justifiable.”