MR. DODD: Certainly they were not given to you by Hitler to be thrown away, and when you consented to carry them, you did not know that they were not going to be utilized, did you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Anything further was the task of Seyss-Inquart who, according to the Berchtesgaden agreement, had contact with the Reich and Party offices...
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you try to answer the question instead of answering something else?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Very well...
MR. DODD: Well, I am not going to press it any further. You seem to think that you had some other reasons, but I do not want to press it any further.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: No, I would be very grateful if I could follow, but I do not understand this question.
MR. DODD: Well, if you do not understand it, I do not think there is any point in pressing it.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I should be very grateful if you would repeat it.
MR. DODD: What I suggested in my question was what you, at least, knew about this false telegram which was handed to you, a draft of it, I think you said either by Hitler or by Göring. You were then a Minister without Portfolio of the Austrian Government. You certainly knew it was a complete falsehood and yet you were willing to go back to Austria and deal with Seyss-Inquart, knowing that such a telegram had been arranged, and that it had been sent by courier.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The telegram had lost all significance through the fact that Schuschnigg canceled the plebiscite, and I told Schuschnigg explicitly—leaving it to Seyss-Inquart, who sat beside me, to say anything more specific—that Hitler would march in if we did not call off the plebiscite. That is exactly what I said to Schuschnigg.