RAINER: Yes. Schuschnigg postponed the plebiscite, but he refused to give a date for a new plebiscite and gave orders to Dr. Seyss, the Security Minister, to adopt severe measures. That solution was reported to the Chancellery in Berlin by telephone in the afternoon, and it produced the statement from the Reich that this solution, as a half-solution, was not acceptable any more. As far as I know, that started the intervention by the German Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: But was not intervention already brought about through the fact that Glaise-Horstenau, as has been stated, or a courier, took a letter from Adolf Hitler to Vienna?
RAINER: It was my view that certain drafts which Globocznik showed me at midday, and which had been addressed to the Landesleitung offices, had been brought along by Glaise-Horstenau who came back from Berlin that morning. As I heard later, that was reportedly done by a courier. In my opinion this was not an intervention on the part of the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was there collaboration between the Party and the Reich on one hand, and Seyss-Inquart on the other?
RAINER: If you mean “conspiracy” by “collaboration,” then I must say definitely, “no.” But the collaboration which was agreed upon at Berchtesgaden was carried out.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Klausner give the order that the Party was free to act and that it was to seize power?
RAINER: Through a specific order from Adolf Hitler, the Party was bound not to undertake any revolutionary steps. That order had been retransmitted by Keppler during the early days of March, and Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop had called Keppler, who was already in the plane, back in order to impress upon him...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, surely, the question was what Klausner did, and the witness is now telling us what a lot of other people did.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
I asked you, when did Klausner give the order to the Gauleiter to seize power?