M. DEBENEST: Will you proceed?
SCHWEBEL: Herr Kiehl was the hydrostatic expert for the Reich Commissioner; but at the same time, he was a hydrostatic expert under the military commander. He was consulted by both authorities as an expert only. He was a very fine expert. But nobody had given him any right to give instructions...
M. DEBENEST: Please, do not make any speeches; answer directly. “Yes” or “no,” did Kiehl transmit the order to flood the Wieringer Sea?
SCHWEBEL: But I must say how it was! Kiehl? No. He could not have done that.
M. DEBENEST: I am not asking you whether he gave the order; I am asking whether he merely transmitted this order.
SCHWEBEL: I know absolutely nothing about that. I do not know how far Kiehl was involved in this order.
M. DEBENEST: That is sufficient.
What was the interest at that time in flooding the Wieringer Sea? Did not people think that the war was over?
SCHWEBEL: No. When the Wieringer Sea—the Wieringer Polder—was flooded, the war had not yet ended and these agreements had not been concluded either. When the Wieringer Polder was flooded—and I found this out later from military men—there was the danger that an aerial landing on the terrain of the Wieringer Sea would take place, which might place the dike in the hands of the enemy, giving them access to Friesland and North Holland. That was the reason why the military authorities considered this flooding necessary. That is what I was told.
M. DEBENEST: But at that moment in Holland wasn’t the war considered as being lost for Germany?