THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, that is quite a wrong conception. We are now hearing evidence. When we hear you we shall be hearing arguments and we shall be prepared to hear any argument from you.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, but I want to avoid it being said these are my arguments. These arguments come from the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: I am pointing out to you that it is the function of counsel to argue and it is the function of the Tribunal to listen to argument. It is not the function of the Tribunal to listen to argument in the course of evidence.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Very well.
VON NEURATH: Perhaps I may make one statement. In the course of the winter of 1936, we had learned through our military intelligence service that the French General Staff already had a military plan for invading Germany. This invasion was to take place through the Rhineland and along the so-called Main River line toward Czechoslovakia in order to join the Russian ally.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: On the basis of what the President just said, I shall dispense with the evidence, or rather with your considerations, and reserve for myself the right to bring this up in my final speech. I should like to ask just one more question. Did the decision to reoccupy the Rhineland constitute any aggressive intention for the moment or later on?
VON NEURATH: No, none whatever. The reoccupation, as can be seen from my statements, had a purely defensive character and was not intended to have any other purpose. The occupation by such a weak force as a single division made it clear that it was a purely symbolic act. It has been testified to here by the military—the witness Milch, for example—that the Luftwaffe had no part whatever and had learned of the action only 2 or 3 days before. That there were no aggressive plans for the future is shown by the fact that the German Government, at the suggestion of England, on 12 March 1936 undertook, until such time as an understanding had been reached with the Western Powers, particularly with France, not to increase the garrisons in the Rhineland and not to move the troops any closer to the border than they were already, on condition, however, that France would do the same. France did not want to accept this offer. Then, in the memorandum of 7 March 1936 addressed to the signatory powers of Locarno, which the Prosecution has already submitted here, Germany not only made definite suggestions for an agreement with France, Belgium, and the other Locarno Powers, but also declared her willingness to sign a general Air Pact to avoid the danger of sudden air raids, and in addition to join the League of Nations again. In a speech to the Reichstag on 7 March 1936 Hitler explained to the world the reasons for the reoccupation of the Rhineland. This speech, as well as the memorandum, I had discussed beforehand with Hitler, and I can only repeat that I did not have the slightest suspicion that Hitler was not honest or that he was trying to conceal his real intentions which tended toward war. Even today I have the firm conviction that at that time Hitler was not thinking of war. I need not emphasize that any such intention was far from my own thoughts. On the contrary, I considered the restoration of sovereignty throughout the Reich a step toward peace and understanding.
THE PRESIDENT: Let us get on. Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, you are allowing the defendant to make long, long speeches. That is not the object of evidence.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to submit various documents in this connection and ask the Court to take judicial notice of the following documents in my Document Book 4. First, Number 109, memorandum of 7 March 1936 from the Reich Government to the signatory powers of the Locarno Treaty; Number 112, the official statement of the German Reich Government on 12 March 1936, and Number 113, the communication from the German Ambassador in London to the British Foreign Minister Mr. Eden, on 12 March 1936; and Number 116, a memorandum dated 3 January 1936 sent by the German Government to the British Government through the Ambassador Extraordinary in London, Herr Von Ribbentrop.
[Turning to the defendant.] What were the consequences of the reoccupation of the Rhineland as far as foreign policy was concerned?