M. DEBENEST: Did you not put an embargo on the means of transport and on the food in transit?
SEYSS-INQUART: Certainly.
M. DEBENEST: That was you, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I said that yesterday.
M. DEBENEST: Consequently, you knew very well at that time what the food situation was in Holland and the grave consequences which would inevitably result from the decision which you made—a very serious decision.
SEYSS-INQUART: No, not really. The fact was that traffic had already been disrupted because of requisitioning by the Armed Forces, and it was only a question of finding a modus vivendi and after insuring the needs of the Armed Forces, which appeared urgent to me, of resuming the transport of foodstuffs into Holland. If the railroad strike had not taken place, I would have succeeded in persuading the Armed Forces to refrain from requisitioning, and navigation would have been left undisturbed.
M. DEBENEST: But we are not discussing the Armed Forces. You knew very well that the moment you placed this embargo on ships, on the fleet, that it was the time when they were transporting foodstuffs for the winter to Holland.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, at the moment when I declared the embargo, there was actually no more traffic; and the few ships carrying food were requisitioned by the Armed Forces together with the foodstuffs.
M. DEBENEST: Then your decision was useless?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, because in making this decision I prevailed upon the Armed Forces to make the requisitioning as short as possible and they promised me that the ships which I earmarked would not be interfered with by them.