The four chief prosecutors have discussed the problem in their opening speeches, sometimes as the central theme of their presentation, sometimes as a fundamental matter, while indeed differing in their conceptions thereof.
It is now up to the Defense to examine it. The body of Defense Counsel have asked me to conduct this examination. It is true that it is for each counsel to decide whether and to what extent he feels in a position to renounce, as a result of my arguments, his own presentation of the question of breach of the peace. However, I have reason to believe that counsel will avail themselves of this opportunity to such an extent that the intention of the Defense to contribute materially toward a technical simplification of the phase of the Trial which is now beginning, will be realized by my speech.
I am concerned entirely with the juridical question, not with the appreciation of the evidence submitted during the past months. Also, I am dealing only with the problems of law as it is at present valid, not with the problem of such law as could or should be demanded in the name of ethics or of human progress.
My task is purely one of research; research desires nothing but the truth, knowing full well that its goal can never be attained and that its path is therefore without end.
I wish to thank the General Secretary of the Tribunal for having placed at my disposal documents of a decisive nature and very important literature. Without this chivalrous assistance it would not have been possible, under the conditions obtaining at present in Germany, to complete my work. The literature accessible to me originated predominantly in the United States. Familiar as I am with the vast French and English literature on this subject, which I have studied during the last quarter of a century—I am, unfortunately, not conversant with the Russian language—I believe, however, that I can fairly say that no important concept has been overlooked, because in no other country of the world has the discussion of our problem, which has become the great problem of humanity, been more comprehensive and more profound than in the United States.
This very fact has enabled me to forego the use of legal literature published in the former German sphere of control. In this way even the semblance of a pro domo line of argumentation will be avoided.
Owing to the short time at my disposal for the purpose of this speech, and at the same time in view of the abundance and complexity of the problems with which I have to deal, it will not be possible for me to cite all the documents and quotations I am referring to. I shall present only a few sentences. Any other procedure would interrupt the train of argument for the listener. I shall therefore submit to the Tribunal the documents and literary references in the form of appendices to my juridical arguments. What I am saying can thus quickly be verified.
The Charter threatens individuals with punishment for breaches of the peace between states. It would appear that the Tribunal is accepting the Charter as the unchallengeable foundation for all juridical considerations. This means that the tribunal will not examine the question whether the Charter, as a whole or in parts, is open to juridical objections; yet such a question nevertheless continues to exist.
If this is so, why, then, have any discussion at all on the main fundamental legal problems?
The British chief prosecutor even made it the central theme of his long address to examine the relationship of the Charter, where our problem is concerned, to existing international law. He justified the necessity of his arguments by saying that it was the task of this Trial to serve humanity and that this task could be fulfilled by the Trial only if the Charter could hold its own before international law, that is, if punishment of individuals for breach of the peace between states was established in existing international law.