The Prosecution further accuses Herr Von Ribbentrop of having known that Hitler as early as the spring of 1939 was determined to wage war against Poland and that Danzig served only as pretext for this conflict. They deduce this from Documents USA-27 and USA-30. These are Hitler’s well-known speeches of 23 May and 22 August 1939. First of all I wish to point out that Herr Von Ribbentrop was not present at these conferences intended only for the military leaders.
A number of key documents have been discussed in detail here. I only wish to name the best known, such as the Hossbach Document, the two Schmundt Files, and the afore-mentioned speeches. Quite a number of statements about these documents have been submitted in evidence. People who knew Hitler well stated that they had become accustomed to his extravagant ideas expounded in sudden speeches, in which he often repeated himself, and that they did not take them seriously in view of his singularity.
It is possible to counter these documents with quite a number of speeches in which Hitler has asserted the contrary. Here, conversely, it might be pointed out that Hitler pursued some definite purpose with his utterances. That may be quite true. But it is just as true that even the few key documents which were submitted as proof of aggressive war contain so many contradictions, with regard to the aggressive intentions deduced from them, that at best a critic judging retrospectively could recognize such intentions. Besides, the contents of these documents, in accordance with the strict regulations for secrecy, became known only to those who took part in the conferences. This might explain why Herr Von Ribbentrop learned about them only here in the courtroom.
The guiding principles as to foreign policy which Hitler laid down for him at that time covered merely the reincorporation of Danzig and the establishment of an extraterritorial road through the Corridor, in order to open a direct land route to East Prussia.
As the Tribunal will remember, Hitler had told Herr Von Ribbentrop already at the time of his appointment as Foreign Minister that it was desirable to achieve these aims. This demand was just as much historically justified as some solution in the case of earlier incorporations of areas inhabited by Germans, which had become inevitable.
The statute of the purely German city of Danzig, which was created by the Treaty of Versailles in the course of the establishment of a Polish state, had always been the cause of friction between Germany and Poland. Poland had achieved this solution at Versailles through the argument that it needed an outlet to the sea. For the same reason the Corridor was established against all ethnological needs. Clemenceau in his memorandum already referred to this artificial creation as a source of danger, especially due to the fact that the peoples living in this area had been separated through long years of bitter enmity. It was not difficult to foresee that as a result of this fact the League of Nations and the International Court at The Hague were constantly going to be occupied with complaints about Polish violations of the agreement on minorities. The same cause gave rise to the large-scale confiscation of up to a million hectares of German estates and the expulsion of far more than a million Germans in the course of 20 years. Not without reason did Lord d’Abernon speak of the Danzig-Corridor problem as the “powder magazine of Europe.” When finally a solution of this question was sought under recognition of the Polish claim to the preservation of an outlet to the sea, such an endeavor appeared both sensible and historically justified.
The evidence has produced nothing to support the claim that this question served merely as a pretext, which Herr Von Ribbentrop could not but have known. It has produced no proof that Herr Von Ribbentrop was acquainted with those of Hitler’s aims which went far beyond these demands. Nor has it been proved that Herr Von Ribbentrop, as has been asserted by the Prosecution, before 1 September 1939, did all he possibly could to prevent peace with Poland, although he knew that a war with Poland would draw Great Britain and France into the conflict. The Prosecution base this statement on Document TC-73. This is a report by the Polish Ambassador to Berlin, Lipski, to his Foreign Minister. The document contains nothing whatsoever to substantiate this assertion.
Moreover, I do not believe that, according to the result of the evidence, Lipski can be valued as a particularly reliable witness. May I recall that it was Lipski who, during the decisive stage of the negotiations before the outbreak of the war, remarked that he had not the least cause to be interested in notes or propositions from the German side and that he knew the situation in Germany quite well after a period of 5½ years as Ambassador. He was convinced that in case of war riots would break out in Germany and that the Polish Army would march victoriously into Berlin.
According to the testimony of the witness Dahlerus it was none other than Lipski who, during the decisive discussion at the Polish Embassy, created the impression among the Swedes that Poland was sabotaging every possibility for negotiations.
Further results of the evidence also speak against the above allegations presented by the Prosecution, as for instance the fact that Herr Von Ribbentrop, after he had learned that the Polish-English guarantee pact had been signed, intervened with Hitler to cancel the order for the Armed Forces to march because a conflict with Poland would also, in his opinion, have drawn in the Western Powers. This opinion coincides with the conclusions to which Herr Von Ribbentrop had come in his review of the European situation and laid down in Document TC-75, which has already been mentioned.