I come to the Indictment against Field Marshal Keitel. I shall shorten the reading of Pages 19 to 21. The reading of the general Indictment and the special Indictment in the trial briefs can be omitted here since, with the exception of the Jewish problem and the persecution of the Church, there is no part of the Indictment which the Prosecution has not raised against the Defendant Keitel.
I should wish merely to point out that the original general Indictment holds Keitel responsible only for the period after 1938 and secondly, that at the beginning of the Indictment, Keitel is described as Chief of Army Command. According to the evidence submitted by the Prosecution, Keitel was also held responsible for the period after 1933, although the American, British, and French Prosecutions seem to have dropped the allegation that Keitel was Chief of Army Command. The Indictment of Field Marshal Keitel is split, therefore, between the periods 1933 to 1938—that is, 4 February 1938—and from 4 February 1938 until the end.
I shall now continue on Page 21, the last paragraph.
Herewith the defendant is not only indicted as a member of the conspiracy but is also accused of personally participating in all the crimes in the Indictment. The space which the Prosecution has devoted to the defendant in its statements corresponds with the comprehensive Indictments. The name of no other defendant has been mentioned so often by the Prosecution as that of the Defendant Keitel. Again and again we hear the words “Keitel’s order,” “Keitel’s decree,” and just as often “order of the OKW,” “directives of the OKW,” along with Keitel’s name as “Chief, OKW” after 4 February 1938.
From this is derived the very substance of the Indictment, namely, the position the Defendant Keitel occupied after 4 February 1938. But from it is also derived the scope of the justification. Here it is not a question of examining to what extent the defendant participated in the individual facts of the case, which in the long run arose from the so-called “Keitel orders” or “OKW instructions”; but what matters is the position he occupied—whether he took part and what part he took in the planning and execution of those orders and instructions, and finally and most important of all, whether his part in it was causal and culpable in the sense of the law which is to be applied here.
It seems to be of importance to stress from the outset several points of view which are important for the treatment of the case and for its judgment.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?