They pointed out Document Number EC-405, the minutes of the Committee for Reich Defense, session of 26 June 1934, in which there is mention of “participation in preparing mobilization.” In these minutes under (c) can be found: “Preparation for the liberation of the Rhine.” From this the prosecuting authorities have drawn the conclusion that already on 26 June 1934 the Reich Defense Committee was contemplating the “liberation of the Rhine.” The witness Reich Marshal Göring has stated during his hearing that, given the unequivocal wording of the German text, it is a question here of the technical freeing of the river Rhine, but not of any strategic or political matter. I am mentioning this manifest error by the prosecuting authorities, which can only have occurred through a gross mistake in translation, because it has led to an erroneous conception of the prosecution as to the competence of the Reich Defense Committee, and because it is the only case which has come up in connection with this complex.
The true nature of the Reich Defense Committee’s activities is set out quite simply and clearly in the Manual of Mobilization for the Civilian Administration; Documents 1639-PS and 1639a-PS. It refers to the result of discussions between all the experts of the Reich Defense Committee, and is an appendix to the mobilization plan of the Armed Forces as well as to that of armaments.
These three mobilization plans all taken together form the basis of your decision. You may see from them whether the Prosecution is right in its assumption of a total planning for aggressive war, or whether the Defendant Keitel was right when he stated during his hearing:
“What has been discussed and planned here is what every country is entitled to do and what the responsible agencies are bound to do, if they do not wish to violate their most sacred duty, namely the safeguarding of the security of their country.”
The decision of 4 February 1938 was fateful for General Keitel as well as for the German Wehrmacht: for Keitel who could not yet form an opinion on the newly-created office of the “High Command of the Armed Forces” (OKW) for the Armed Forces which on that day lost its relative independence.
Hitler broke down the last barriers between himself and the Armed Forces—the nation in arms—by removing both the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the constitutionally responsible Reich War Minister. This truly portentous decision was fatal for Keitel and the German nation, though at the time of its occurrence this was not realized by the participants. That they must be blamed for not realizing it is easy to say now, in retrospect.
At the time everybody who was not an inveterate skeptic or pessimist had to base his judgment on the development of things in general and on the strength of the personalities involved. Neither the one nor the other could be clearly appreciated on 4 February 1938.
It was not a personal decision of the Defendant Keitel who did not know Hitler personally in these days and who met him for the first time man to man in the preliminary discussions. Hitler assigned him to the newly-created office of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Keitel accepted it. Even if we disregard entirely the human emotions connected with such a brilliant promotion there was no reasonable ground for the then Chief of the Armed Forces Department in the Reich War Ministry to decline the offer, since Von Blomberg himself had recommended him. Hitler’s ideas about this office could not be discerned by Keitel. I shall pass to the next page...
The decree gave Keitel a wonderfully impressive office name as “Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces.” The historical foundation is the elimination of the commanding authority over the entire Armed Forces, which up to 4 February 1938 was in the hands of Field Marshal Von Blomberg, and on that day was taken over by Hitler himself. Hitler created at the same time the responsible Ministry of War, which up to that time had also been administrated by Field Marshal Von Blomberg. Dr. Lammers says the following about the origin of the Führer’s Decree of 4 February 1938: (Morning Session of 8 April 1946; Volume XI, Page 29.)
“The Führer informed me that the Reich Minister of War, Von Blomberg, is resigning his office and that he avails himself of this opportunity to make some other changes in the Reich Government, particularly since the Foreign Minister, Von Neurath, is going to retire, which will make a change; there is also a change in the High Command of the Army. In this connection the Führer gave orders for a decree to be worked out regarding the Command of the Armed Forces. It was to be merged with the Ministry of War. As a directive the Führer gave me the following instruction: