Dr. Gisevius himself has said here that it was strictly forbidden for officers to concern themselves with political questions. The Defendant Keitel has stated that Hitler several times categorically declared the politicians were not allowed to concern themselves with military questions because they knew nothing of them; neither were the generals allowed to concern themselves with politics, because they knew nothing about that either.
Hitler’s fundamental attitude in this question is shown in the decree dating from 1936, or the winter 1936-37, by which political reports to or for the Armed Forces were prohibited.
In logical execution of Führer Order Number 1, Hitler not only wanted an absolute separation of the fields of activity, but also that no office should ever be informed of the proceedings in another office. It was only a logical consequence that Hitler strictly prohibited any discussion of political questions by officers, and that the Defendant Keitel, while carrying out this prohibition which he himself approved, charged his officers, when there was reason to do so, to refrain from such discussions.
It is obvious that this was not a question of an academic discussion of political problems, but of an attitude revealing itself as negative toward the position of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. As long as there were successes, there was no question of this. After Stalingrad one could hear expressions of opinion, which at that time were characterized by Keitel as the expressions of a weak nature.
In accordance with his fundamental attitude that a soldier in wartime should show unconditional and natural loyalty toward his people and fatherland as represented by the head of the State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (and to an extreme degree when reverses set in), Keitel was actually ruthless in condemning such expressions. He did not wish even to cause the impression that he was of a different opinion than his superior, that he personally had fears.
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Keitel did this with “words.” That does not mean that this was mere camouflage which did not reflect his inner attitude, but it does mean that the manner, perhaps often rough and harsh, in which the Defendant Keitel spoke to his officers, more than once led to an officer being punished or disciplined.
Dr. Gisevius, however, perhaps wanted to suggest that Keitel had dealt with his subordinates in the OKW in a morally reprehensible way.
He did not know the Defendant Keitel personally and therefore cannot give a personal opinion; he had to rely on the information of officers who were strongly opposed to Keitel, without such opposition ever becoming apparent. No one ever contacted Keitel to entice him to join in the conspiracy. That is plausible since the conspirators, knowing the character and the soldierly attitude of Keitel, could not expect any success. Since on the other hand Keitel was completely innocent, which does not need to be proved, the following situation results:
Keitel knew nothing of conspiratorial activities; what he did encounter appeared in the shape of technical objections or personal remarks which were dealt with by Keitel officially and in a cordial manner, as by a superior of whom the subordinates say that he barks but does not bite. On the other side the so-called conspirators had to consider everyone a foe who was not in favor of their own aim. Every move and every word was weighed and critically judged. As every conspirator hopes for the success of his revolutionary activities he has to gather evidence for the coming reckoning. This is, of course, a task for a future police minister and home secretary.