The further reproach of the basic lack of working-class elements to strengthen the Putsche is contradicted by the social composition of the revolutionaries of 20 July. As I stated before, all this is irrelevant for the decision of the Tribunal. But my client is morally entitled to expect his defense counsel not to let this ironical thrust pass, especially since it was delivered in the limelight of public opinion.
In summing up I may say: After the elections in July 1932 it was certain that Hitler was able and bound to seize power. Previous to this Schacht had particularly warned the foreign countries of this development, and thus he had not contributed to it. After the seizure of power only two roads were open to him, as to every German: He either had to estrange himself or to enter the Movement actively. The decision at these crossroads was a purely political one without any criminal aspect. Just as we respect the reasons which caused the foreign countries to collaborate with Hitler much more intensively and in a more pro-German way than with the previous democratic Governments of Germany, we must recognize the good faith of all those Germans who believed themselves able to serve the country and humanity better by remaining in the Movement, that is, within the Party or the apparatus of officialdom, because of the greater possibilities of exerting their influence, than by grumbling and keeping aloof. To serve Hitler as minister and President of the Reichsbank was a political decision, about the political correctness of which one can argue ex post facto but one which certainly lacked any criminal character. Schacht has always remained loyal to the motivating reason for his decision, namely, to combat any radicalism from an influential position. Nowhere in the world, which knew his oppositional attitude, could he see any signs of warning or support. He saw only that the world trusted Hitler much longer than he himself did and permitted Adolf Hitler to gain honors and foreign political successes, which hampered Schacht’s work which had already for a long time been directed toward removing Adolf Hitler and his Government. He led this struggle against Adolf Hitler and his Government with a courage and determination which must make it appear a pure miracle that not until after 20 July 1944 did fate overtake him, when he was sent to a concentration camp and was in danger of losing his life either through the Peoples’ Court or through a spectacular act of the SS. He is sufficiently wise and self-critical to realize that from a purely political angle the picture of his character will be adjudged diversely in history, or at least in the immediate future, according to favor or hatred of the parties. He humbly resigns himself to the judgment of history, even if one historian or another will label his political line as incorrect. But with the pride of a good conscience he faces the judgment of this High Tribunal. He stands before his judges with clean hands. He also stands before this Tribunal with confidence, as he has already manifested in a letter which he addressed to this Tribunal before the beginning of the proceedings, in which he states that he is grateful to be able to expose before this Tribunal and before the whole world his actions and doings and their underlying reasons. He stands before this Tribunal with confidence because he knows that favor or hatred of the parties will have no effect on this Tribunal. While recognizing the relativity of all political actions in such difficult times, he remains sure of himself and full of confidence with regard to the criminal charges which have been raised against him. Whoever would be found guilty of being criminally responsible for this war and the atrocities and inhuman acts committed in it, Schacht, according to the evidence which has been given here with minute exactness, can confront that culprit with the words which Wilhelm Tell flings in the face of the emperor’s assassin, Parricida: “I raise my clean hands to Heaven, and curse you and your deed!”
I therefore request the findings to be established to the effect that Schacht is not guilty of the accusation which has been raised against him and that he be acquitted.
THE PRESIDENT: I call on Dr. Kranzbühler for the Defendant Dönitz.
FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for the Defendant Dönitz): Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: “War is a cruel thing, and it brings in its train a multitude of injustices and misdeeds.”[[2]] With these words of Plutarch’s, Hugo Grotius begins his examination of responsibility for war crimes; and they are as true today as they were 2,000 years ago. Acts constituting war crimes, or considered as such by the opponent, have at all times been committed by belligerents. But this fact was always held against the vanquished parties and never against the victors. The law which was applied here was necessarily always the law of the stronger.
While more or less stable rules have been governing land warfare for centuries, in naval warfare the conceptions of the belligerents with regard to international law have always clashed. No one knows better than the British statesmen to what extent these conceptions are dictated by national or economic interests. I refer in this respect to noted witnesses such as Lord Fisher and Lord Edward Grey.[[3]] Therefore, if ever in history a naval power would have had the idea of prosecuting a defeated enemy admiral, based on its own conception of the rules of naval warfare, the sentence would have been a foregone conclusion from the very indictment.
At this trial two admirals are under indictment for a naval war which has been termed criminal. Thus the Tribunal is confronted with a decision regarding conceptions of law which are necessarily as divergent as the interests of a naval power and a land power. It is not only the fate of the two admirals which depends upon this decision. It is also a question of personal honor to hundreds of thousands of German seamen who believed they were serving a good cause, and who do not deserve to be branded by history as pirates and murderers. It is for these men, the living as well as the dead, that I feel bound by a moral obligation to reject the accusations raised against German naval warfare.
What are these accusations? They are divided into two main groups: Unlawful sinking of ships and deliberate killing of shipwrecked personnel. I shall deal first with the accusation of the illegal sinking of ships.
Two reports by Mr. Roger Allen, of the British Foreign Office, made in the autumn of 1940 and spring of 1941, form the nucleus of that accusation. I do not know to whom and for what purpose these reports were made. According to their form and content they appear to serve propaganda purposes, and for that reason alone I consider them to have little value as evidence. Even the Prosecution submitted only part of the accusations made therein. The reports trace only one-fifth of the total number of supposedly unlawful attacks back to submarines, whereas four-fifths are ascribed to mines, airplanes, or surface craft. The Prosecution omits these four-fifths, and this reticence may be explained by the fact that the use of these combat means on the British side differed in no way from that on the German side.
With regard to the use of submarines, however, there does seem to exist a difference between the principles followed in Germany’s conduct of the naval war and that of our enemies. At any rate, the public in enemy countries and in many neutral countries believed so during the war, and partly still believes it today. Propaganda dominated the field. At the same time the vast majority of all critics neither knew exactly what principles applied to German U-boat warfare, nor on what factual and legal foundations they were based. It shall be my task to attempt to clarify this.