[3] Lord Edward Grey: “Twenty-five Years of Politics 1892-1916.” (Retranslated into English from the German edition published by Bruckmann, Munich 1926). “International Law has always been very flexible.... A belligerent possessing an over-powerful navy has at all times been in search of an interpretation of International Law which would justify a maximum of intervention in respect of merchandise liable to reach the enemy. This attitude was naturally adopted by Great Britain and the Allies owing to their supremacy at sea. The British position on this subject had not always been the same. When we figured among the neutrals, we naturally contested the right to maximum intervention claimed by the belligerents.”
[4] Yamato Ichihalie, The Washington Conference and After, Stanford University Press, Cal., 1928, Page 80, “The chief reason for the British plea was the apprehension of the craft in the hands of the French navy.”
[5] Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, Washington, November 12, 1921-February 6, 1922, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1922, Pages 606, 688, 692.
[6] French Yellow Book, La Conférence de Washington, Page 93.
[7] Protocol Pages 693, 702.
[8] Protocol Page 704.
[9] American Journal of International Law, 1931, Page 307.
[10] Hyde, International Law, 1922, Vol. II, Page 469.
[11] U.S. Foreign Relations, 1916, Supplement Page 147.