Especially in this Trial, which itself is supposed to serve the development of new international law, the possibility of such a development cannot be denied.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit in open session after 1 o’clock tomorrow, Wednesday; it will sit in closed session during the afternoon. The Tribunal will not sit in open session on Saturday; it will sit in closed session on Saturday morning.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Before the recess I was speaking about the possibilities of development of naval law.

The American prosecutor, Justice Robert Jackson, in his report to the President of the United States with regard to this problem, expressed his opinions as follows, and I quote:[[26]]

“International law is not capable of development by legislation, for there is no continuously sitting international legislature. Innovations and revisions in international law are brought about by the action of governments, designed to meet a change in circumstances. It grows, as did the common law, through decisions reached from time to time in adapting settled principles to new situations.”

These words carry a full justification of the clause objected to by the Prosecution in the memorandum of the Naval Operations Staff. And the fact that the Allies also deemed war-deciding measures to be justified even though they were contradictory to hitherto valid concepts of international law is proved by the use of the atomic bomb against Japanese cities.

Since I am interested in justifying the actual measures taken by the Naval Command in Germany; I have not dealt with the point as to which one of the two admirals accused carried greater or lesser responsibility for one or another. As a formal basis in nearly all cases a Führer decree exists. Both admirals, however, stated here that they considered themselves fully responsible for all orders of naval war which they gave or transmitted. I should like to add to that only two remarks.

As far as political considerations were decisive for orders of the U-boat war, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy had no influence on them. The Commander of U-boats had not been notified of such considerations any more than of the political settlement of incidents which arose through U-boats.