2. The German Armistice Commission thereupon instructed Commander-in-Chief West to investigate the incidents.
3. On receiving a letter from Army Group B, the OKW expressed itself as follows:
“It was in the German interest to answer these charges at the earliest possible moment.
“This case shows that there is still widespread ignorance as to the importance of combating all imputations made against the German Armed Forces and all enemy propaganda, and of refuting immediately any alleged acts of atrocity on the part of the Germans.
“The German Armistice Commission is hereby instructed to continue to pursue their investigations as energetically as possible. It is requested that every possible assistance be rendered to the commission and that all possible steps be taken to expedite matters in your own sphere of action. The fact that Pz. AOK/6 is no longer under the jurisdiction of Commander-in-Chief West is no reason for discontinuing the necessary investigation in order to clarify and refute the French charges.”
It may therefore be considered as proved that in this case the Defendant Keitel, on receiving information, took energetic steps in accordance with the range of his competency as Chief of the OKW, and as far as he was in a position to do so. This eliminates the charge made by the Prosecution insofar as the Defendant Keitel is concerned. At the same time, however, the way in which the Defendant Keitel handled this case suggests that he acted in similar manner in other cases.
Mr. President, before dealing with the problem of hostages which I may discuss later, I should like to discuss the grave evidence on the Night and Fog Decree on Page 154.
War, which is frightful even under orderly international law, becomes atrocious when the last restraints are removed. Many terrible things have happened during this war and it is impossible to tell which chapter of this book of sorrows and tears is the saddest; but, in any case, one of the most lamentable chapters is that of the treatment of hostages. In international law the question of treatment of hostages is controversial. The taking of hostages is almost generally admitted. Doubtless, although taking hostages is assumed to be admissible under international law, that has as yet no bearing on their treatment. The treatment, even more than the seizure, of hostages must be subject on the one hand to the law of absolute military necessity which cannot otherwise be met, and, on the other, to the application of all possible guarantees to prevent the indiscriminate shooting of hostages as a principle. Any primitive and brutal handling of this very institution, which is doubtful under international law and is apt to affect the absolutely innocent, must be rejected.
Unfortunately, this problem which seldom arose in previous wars between civilized people, acquired considerable importance during World Wars I and II. The cases previously taken into consideration and also explained in the Army Manual 2g (H. Dv. 2g) (Document Book 1, Exhibit Number Keitel-7) resulted from military necessity of troops in operation. As happened with so many things in this war, but especially due to the change-over from theater of operations to rear area, there finally developed a broadening and degeneration in the application of a principle which originally was indisputable according to international law.
The immediate connection with military necessity was absent, that is to say, with military action; its place was taken by interests which naturally included military safeguards, particularly of lines of communications between the front zone and home.