I need only say a few words about the order issued in the spring of 1945, in which a German prisoner of war, a noncommissioned officer, was cited as an example, because he had unobtrusively and systematically done away with some Communists who were attracting attention to themselves in their prison camp. As Admiral Wagner recalled, it was actually an informer who was liquidated. But the facts were camouflaged as described in order to avoid giving enemy intelligence a clue to the camp and the person of the noncommissioned officer. There cannot be any doubt that this order in its true background could be justified in view of the enormous number of political murders which have been committed with the connivance or assistance of governments engaged in the war, the perpetrators being today extolled as heroes. I cannot, however, consider as serious the argument that the unfortunately camouflaged wording could be proof of a general plan to liquidate Communists. A court judgment for the protection of Communists will reveal the true circumstances. A sergeant had stolen hospital blankets which were intended for Soviet prisoners of war and had extracted a dead prisoner’s gold teeth. This sergeant was sentenced to death by a naval court and executed after the sentence had been confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief.
Finally, the Prosecution also established a connection with the Jewish question through a remark in which Grossadmiral Dönitz speaks of the “creeping poison of Jewry.” On this point I should like to add some comments. Dönitz knew as little of the plan for the destruction of the Jews as he did of its execution. He did know of the resettlement in the Government General of Jews living in Germany. I do not think that a resettlement of this sort can be condemned at a time when expulsions of Germans on a much larger scale are taking place before the eyes of a silent world. Here, too, I refer to a sentence of long penitentiary terms against two German sailors who, together with some Frenchmen, had robbed French Jews. From the findings of the court I again quote a sentence which characterizes the general attitude: “That the crimes were committed against Jews does not excuse the defendants in any way.”
Similarly, it seems to me that the efforts of the Prosecution to include Admiral Dönitz in its construction of the conspiracy by terming him a fanatical Nazi have failed. He was neither a member of the Party nor was he ever politically prominent before his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The assertion of the Prosecution that he became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy because of his political attitude lacks all foundation. As a professional officer, to whom every political activity was forbidden by the Reich Defense Law, he had no reason for dealing with National Socialism in any way. However, he, too, like millions of other Germans, recognized the unique success of Hitler’s leadership in social and economic fields and, of course, also the liberation from the obligations of Versailles which Hitler had brought about and which particularly concerned Admiral Dönitz as a soldier. Therefore, at the time of his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, he was politically in no way active, although loyal to the National Socialist State.
This appointment introduced two new elements into his relations with National Socialism. There was first of all his personal contact with Adolf Hitler. Like almost everyone else who had personal dealings with this man, he too was most deeply impressed by him. The respect for the head of the State and loyalty to the Supreme Commander inherent in the professional officer were complemented by admiration for the statesman and strategist. It is difficult fully to appreciate such an attitude in view of the information which has come to light in the course of this Trial. I feel neither called upon nor able to judge a personality like Adolf Hitler. But one thing seems to me certain, namely, that with a consummate art of camouflage he skillfully concealed the repulsive traits of his character from those of his collaborators to whom he did not dare reveal this part of his nature. The Hitler with whom the new Commander-in-Chief of the Navy became acquainted at that time, and whom he admired, was therefore an entirely different man from the one which the world—rightly or wrongly—pictures today.
The second new element in the relations between Grossadmiral Dönitz and National Socialism was that in the performance of his military duties he necessarily came into contact with the political authorities of the Reich. Whether he needed more men, more ships, or more arms, in the end he always had to discuss these matters with the political authorities, and in order to be successful in his demands, he had to make sure that any political mistrust was eliminated from the very start. This he deliberately did, and he demanded the same of his subordinates. To him the Party was not an ideological factor, but rather the actual exponent of political power. He was linked with it in the common aim to win the war, and for the achievement of this aim he considered it his ally. But to obtain the advantages which one expects of an ally, one must be willing to make certain sacrifices, especially sacrifices in overlooking faults and in ignoring conflicting issues.
However, his connection with the Führer and his contact with the Party, which were concomitants of his position and of his duties as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, never led him to participate in anything for which he could not assume responsibility before his conscience. Some points of the Prosecution even go to prove this. The Führer demanded action against shipwrecked crews; Admiral Dönitz rejected it. The Führer asked for withdrawal from the Geneva Convention; Admiral Dönitz rejected it. He stubbornly and successfully resisted the Party’s influence upon the Armed Forces. Thanks to his resistance the National Socialist Führungsoffiziere did not become political commissars, but were, as genuine officers, merely advisers to their commander, who retained the sole responsibility for the leadership of his unit. The transfer of proceedings against soldiers on political grounds from the military courts to the People’s Courts, which had been advocated by the Party, was prevented by Grossadmiral Dönitz until the winter of 1944-45, and a Führer order to this effect issued at that time was never carried out in the Navy. Thus he never identified himself with the Party and can therefore surely not be held responsible for its ideological endeavors or its excesses, just as in foreign politics a government would not be ready to assume responsibility for such things if they had been done by an ally.
I do not by any means want to give the impression that Admiral Dönitz was not a National Socialist. On the contrary, I just want to use him as an example to disprove the theory that every National Socialist as such must be a criminal. This Tribunal is the sole instance in which authoritative personalities of the great Allied Powers are dealing directly and in detail with the last 12 years of the German past. It is, therefore, the only hope of very many Germans for the removal of a fatal error which is causing the weaker elements of our nation to become hypocrites and is thus proving a decisive obstacle on the road to political recovery.
And now I should like to deal with the charge that in February 1945 Admiral Dönitz protracted the inevitable surrender out of political fanaticism, and I wish to do so for a particular reason. This charge, which seems hardly to have anything to do with the Indictment before an International Tribunal, weighs particularly heavily in the eyes of the German people, for this nation truly knows what destruction and losses it endured in those last months from February until May 1945. I have submitted declarations of Darlan, Chamberlain, and Churchill from the year 1940 in which those statesmen, in a critical hour for their countries, called for desperate resistance, for the defense of every village and of every house. Nobody will conclude from this that these men were fanatical National Socialists. The question of unconditional surrender is indeed of such colossal import to a nation, that in fact it is not possible until after the event to judge whether a statesman who had to face this question did or did not do the right thing. Admiral Dönitz, however, was not a statesman in February 1945, but the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Should he have asked his subordinates to lay down their arms at a time when the political authority of the State still considered military resistance as opportune and necessary? Nobody will seriously demand that.
Much more difficult seems to me the question of whether, in view of the high esteem Hitler had for him, he should not have considered it his duty to point out clearly to Hitler the hopelessness of prolonged resistance.
Personally, I would have affirmed this to be his duty toward his nation, if Admiral Dönitz himself at that time had considered that surrender was justified. He did not consider it justified, and he gave his reasons: Surrender implied a halt of the armies and of the population; the German Army on the Eastern Front—still numbering more than 2 million men in February 1945—and the entire civilian population of the German eastern provinces would thereby have fallen into the hands of the Soviet armies, and in a bitterly cold winter month, too. Admiral Dönitz, therefore, was of the opinion, shared by Generaloberst Jodl, that the losses in men suffered in that way would be far greater than the losses which would necessarily be caused if the capitulation were postponed until the warmer season. Only in future years, when more exact data regarding casualties of the Army and of the civilian population both before and after the surrender in the East and in the West are available, will it be possible to view this opinion objectively. But it may already be said today that such considerations arose entirely from a full sense of responsibility for the life of German men and women.