(6) And now I come to the decisive juridical aspect of all developments up to the summer of 1935. In the field of international law the same principle applies as in the field of internal commercial law: Breaches of agreement are considered adjusted and settled with the signing of a new agreement. In the present case the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 18 June 1935—Exhibit Number Raeder-11—represents the new agreement. This naval agreement deviates completely from the Versailles Treaty both with regard to high-tonnage vessels and with regard to U-boats. It is only on the basis of what is permitted Germany by this new agreement that the insignificance of earlier violations of the Versailles Treaty, not at the time covered by existing agreements, becomes apparent.
10,000-ton cruisers were replaced by 35,000-ton battleships, and the ban on the construction of U-boats was replaced by the acknowledgement of equal rights with regard to U-boat tonnage. Germany’s demands were not unreasonable; on the contrary, in the document mentioned, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom explicitly confirmed the German proposal to be “... an exceedingly important contribution to future limitation of naval armaments.”
This agreement between Britain and Germany concluded the debate on the Versailles Treaty both factually and juridically, as far as the Navy is concerned. This naval agreement was generally welcomed in Britain and Germany at that time, and it was supplemented by a new agreement on 17 June 1937 (see Exhibit Number Raeder-14). As proof of the fact that the Navy violated the naval agreement, too, with aggressive intentions, the Prosecution has raised two charges:
(1) In the Agreement of 1937 both contracting governments were bound to a mutual exchange of information, which was to take place annually, within the first 4 months of every calendar year, and was to contain details of the building program. According to Document C-23, the Navy violated this obligation insofar as it gave lower figures for the displacement and the draught of the battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz which were being built at the beginning of 1938, namely, as 35,000 tons instead of 41,700 tons. That this violation of the treaty did occur is openly admitted by Raeder, but again it is not such a serious violation as the Prosecution contends, that is, it is not a violation which shows proof of criminal intent. That is clear from the detailed evidence I have presented and from the testimonies of witnesses which I need not repeat here; it will be sufficient if I refer to the absolutely convincing expert testimony of the ship-building director, Dr. Süchting, which I have submitted as Exhibit Number Raeder-15. According to this, the increase in tonnage demanded by the Navy during the construction served a purely defensive idea, namely, that of increasing the armor plating of the battleships and of arranging the bulkheads in such a way that the battleships would be virtually unsinkable. This defensive idea, Dr. Süchting emphasizes, actually proved to be correct during the attack on and sinking of the battleship Bismarck. If it was only a question of a defensive idea, no aggressive intentions can be construed from this treaty violation.
With regard to the juridical aspect, it must be added that in the Naval Agreement of 1937, Articles 24, 25, and 26 conceded to the contracting governments the right to deviate, under certain circumstances, from the contracted agreements and especially from the tonnage limitation of battleships, if any other sea powers should build or acquire larger battleships. This case, stated in Article 25, had actually arisen, and so the violation of the agreement consisted in the fact that the Navy, although now entitled to build larger battleships, neglected to inform Britain of her desire to make use of that right. It was, therefore, only a violation of the obligation to exchange information. How meaningless this measure was is proved by the alteration of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement by virtue of the London Protocol of 30 June 1938, which I have submitted as Exhibit Number Raeder-16.
Already on 31 March 1938, that is, only 6 weeks after the date of Document C-23, Britain on her part had stated, according to the London Protocol of 30 June 1938, that she must make use of the afore-mentioned right granted by Article 25, and therefore proposed that the battleship tonnage be increased from 35,000 to 45,000. This agreement was then signed by both countries on 30 June 1938, and thus the violation of the treaty evident from Document C-23, became illusory.
(2) The British prosecutor raised a second charge by submitting Document D-854 during cross-examination. It consists of notes made by Admiral Assmann for his historical writings; on Sheet 15 of these notes he writes that Germany abided by the terms of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement least of all in the sphere of U-boat building and that 55 U-boats were allowed by the treaty up to 1938, but 118 were actually completed or begun. These statements by Assmann are actually incorrect, and in reality Germany strictly followed all the stipulations of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement with regard to U-boat building. Despite the assurance of equality of rights Germany by the Naval Agreement of 1935 voluntarily limited herself to 45 percent; but the right to increase this percentage at any time by friendly agreement with Britain was reserved for her. The presentation of evidence has shown (see the testimony of Raeder and Schulte-Mönting) that in December 1938 corresponding negotiations took place between the British Admiral Lord Cunningham and Grossadmiral Raeder, during which His Majesty’s Government approved the increase to 100 percent. It was not clear at the time when this evidence was presented, whether this approval had also been given in writing, as was to be assumed. Meanwhile I have been able to establish that such a document must have existed; I was able to gather this from the afore-mentioned Assmann Document D-854 in which on Page 169, in connection with Page 161, the letter in question dated 18 January 1939 is mentioned. In conclusion it remains to be said that the figure of 55 U-boats mentioned by Assmann corresponds to 45 percent, whereas the figure of 118 U-boats corresponds to 100 percent; accordingly Assmann, and therefore the Prosecution as well, are wrong. Actually there was no violation at all of the naval agreement with regard to U-boats.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. SIEMERS: I now come to the allegation of the Prosecution that Grossadmiral Raeder took part in a conspiracy to wage wars of aggression, and in particular supported Hitler and National Socialism despite his alleged knowledge that Hitler from the beginning had the intention of waging wars of aggression.
(1) How did Raeder establish contact with Hitler, and was he able, or even bound, at that time to realize an intention on the part of Hitler to wage wars of aggression?