On 27 February 1940, Churchill declared in the House of Commons that he was “tired of considering the rights of neutrals” (Document Raeder-97).

It is interesting to note that unanimity was achieved in the sixth session of the Supreme Council on 28 March 1940—I quote:

“Every endeavor on the part of the Soviet Government to obtain from Norway a position on the Atlantic coast runs counter to the vital interests of the Allies and results in appropriate counteraction” (Document Raeder-83).

The view thereby adopted by the Supreme Council with reference to the vital interests of the Allies coincides exactly with the legitimate notions of the “right of self-defense” as presented by me and is in complete contradiction to the interpretation of international law propounded by the Prosecution.

The ultimate execution of the operation in Norway, that is, the landing and the construction of bases, was decided on 28 March 1940 between the authoritative British and French offices. This date was indicated at a session of the French War Council by the French Prime Minister (Document Raeder-59); and General Gamelin added that he had, on 29 March, impressed upon General Ironside the necessity of having everything ready for a swift occupation of the Norwegian ports. He said he had also informed Mr. Churchill to the same effect on the occasion of a visit to Paris.

One day later, 30 March, Churchill declared on the radio—I quote, “It would not be just if, in a life-and-death struggle, the Western Powers adhered to legal agreements” (Document Raeder-97).

On 2 April 1940 at 1912 hours, London notified Paris by telegram that the first transport was “to sail on J. 1. day,” and that J. 1. day was in principle 5 April (Document Raeder-85). On 5 April, Earl de la Warr stated that neither Germany nor the neutrals could be certain that “England would allow her hands to be tied behind her back in complying with the letter of the law” (Document Raeder-97).

The British Minister of Labor, Ernest Brown, on 6 April 1940 declared that neither Germany nor the neutrals could count on “the Western Powers’ adhering to the letter of international law” (Document Raeder-97).

On the same day—this was one day after the laying of mines by British combat forces in Norwegian territorial waters—a secret British operational order was given “concerning preparations for the occupation of the northern Swedish ore field from Narvik” (Document Raeder-88).

In this order it was specified that the mission of the “Avon” Force consisted first of all in “securing the port of Narvik and the railway to the Swedish border.” It was added that it was the intention of the commander “to advance into Sweden and to occupy the Gallivare ore fields and important points of that territory as soon as an opportunity occurs,” a formulation strikingly reminiscent of the words in the Prosecution Document L-79, “to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.”