(c) In Italy, in the highest instance, it was the Ambassador, Rahn.

This is obvious from the decree of 27 March 1942.

Before Sauckel became active in the execution of his task in the various territories, he invariably turned to Hitler, whose subordinate he was with respect to the Four Year Plan, in order to obtain through his instructions the necessary backing by the local authorities. This was done in such a way that the order was issued to the local authorities to give Sauckel the assistance which he considered necessary for the execution of his task. The Defendant Keitel was not present at such discussions between Hitler and Sauckel, nor did he have any jurisdiction or competence in these questions. However, somebody had to inform the local authorities about Hitler’s orders, and the result was that Hitler, who did not recognize any difficulties of jurisdiction, told the next best man to inform the local authorities about Sauckel and to point out Hitler’s wish to grant him all the necessary assistance.

These “next best” were Keitel, for the military administration of the occupied territories, or Dr. Lammers, for the territories under civilian administration.

Such was the contact which existed between Keitel and Sauckel in this matter. How the details of recruiting or otherwise procuring labor were carried out was not within the competence of the OKW, nor did they receive any reports on the matter. The interest of the OKW was limited to the fact that the required number of soldiers were placed at its disposal through induction by the replacement authorities. In particular, the OKW and the Defendant Keitel had nothing to do with the allocation of the labor procured by the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor within war economy; this was solely the business of the labor offices, where firms requiring labor requested the workers deemed necessary.

(1) The name of Keitel stands at the beginning of Sauckel’s activity, as submitted by the Prosecution, because Keitel was cosignatory to the Führer decree concerning the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor (Document USSR-365). From repeated references of the Prosecution to this fact the conclusion must be drawn that apparently it sees in this cosignatory act of the Defendant Keitel the beginning of a chain of developments, at the end of which stood such frightful happenings as were presented here.

In this connection I would refer to the significance, expounded elsewhere, of the cosignature by Keitel as Chief of the OKW on such decrees of the Führer. This fact, which penally cannot be considered as determinative, does not constitute guilt for the reason that all conception of the events occurring during the further course of developments was lacking.

(2) If the Führer’s decree of March 1942 provides the legal origin of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor (GBA), the first step in the participation of this official is also connected with the name of Keitel as head of the OKW, as the personnel replacements matters were subordinated to him and he made his requests for replacement of losses at the front to the subordinate military replacement offices. Here also the same applies as in (1), as neither an appreciable determinative effect nor criminal guilt was involved.

(3) Owing to the situation, as characterized by the shortage of manpower, there came into being a purely factual connection between the military personnel requirements and the requirements of the economic replacement of workers, without Keitel thereby coming in contact with the GBA either as regards competence or orders.

Sauckel confirmed the statement of Keitel that the OKW had nothing to do with the recruiting, levying, or any other mobilization of labor, nor with the allocation of the labor procured for German economy.