The competent office in the OKW was the “Chief of the Prisoner-of-War Organization,” who was several times made personally responsible by the Prosecution. The Defendant Keitel attaches importance to the fact that the Chief of the Prisoners of War Organization was his subordinate through the Armed Forces Department. Hence the responsibility of the Defendant Keitel in this domain is self-evident, even in those cases in which he did not personally sign orders and decrees.
The basic regulations for the treatment of prisoners of war were: (1) The service regulations issued by the Chief of the OKW within the scope of normal preparations for mobilization, and laid down in a series of Army, Navy, and Air Force publications; (2) the stipulations of the Geneva Convention, to which special reference was made in the service regulations; (3) the general decrees and orders which became necessary from time to time in the course of events.
Apart from the treatment of Soviet Russian prisoners of war who were subject to regulations on an entirely different basis, to which I shall later make particular reference, the provisions of the service regulations in accordance with international law, that is the Geneva Convention, held good. The OKW exercised supervision over the strict observance of these Army service regulations through an Inspector of the Prisoners of War Organization and, from 1943 on, through a further control agency, the Inspector General of the Prisoners of War Organization.
The representatives of the protecting powers and the International Red Cross may be considered as constituting an additional control agency, which no doubt submitted to the various governments reports on inspections and visits to the camps, in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention. No such reports have been submitted here by the Prosecution; I shall come back to the charges made here by the French prosecutor. But the fact that the British and American prosecutors, for instance, have not submitted such reports may well permit the conclusion that the protecting powers did not discover any serious violations with regard to the treatment of inmates of prisoner-of-war camps.
The treatment of prisoners of war, which led to no serious complaints during the first few years of the war with the Western Powers—I except isolated cases like that of Dieppe—became more and more difficult for the OKW from year to year, because political and economic considerations gained a very strong influence in this sector. The Reichsführer SS tried to get the Prisoners of War Organization into his own hands. The resulting struggles for power caused Hitler to turn over the Prisoners of War Organization to Himmler from October 1944 on, the alleged reason being that the Armed Forces had shown itself to be too weak and allowed itself to be influenced by doubts based on international law. Another important factor was the influence exerted on Hitler, and through him on the OKW, by the labor authorities and the armament sector. This influence grew stronger as the labor shortage increased.
The Party Chancellery, the German Labor Front, and the Propaganda Ministry also played a part in this question, which was in itself purely a military one. The OKW was engaged in a constant struggle with all these agencies, most of which had more influence than the OKW.
All these circumstances must be taken into consideration in order properly to understand and evaluate the responsibility of the Defendant Keitel. As he himself had to carry out the functions “by order,” and since Hitler always kept the problem of the Prisoners of War Organization under his personal control for reasons previously described, the Defendant Keitel was scarcely ever in a position to voice his own, that is, military, objections against instructions and orders.
The Treatment of French Prisoners of War.
As a result of the agreement of Montoire, the keynote to apply to relations with French prisoners of war became “collaboration.” Their treatment moved in the direction indicated by this; and discussions with Ambassador Scapini brought about a considerable improvement for them. In this connection I refer to the affidavit of Ambassador Scapini, who states among other things:
“It is correct that General Reinecke examined the questions at hand objectively and without hostility, and that he attempted to regulate them reasonably when this depended on his authority alone. He took a different attitude when the pressure exercised on the OKW by the Labor Service—that is by the Allocation of Labor—and sometimes by the Party made itself felt.”