The question must furthermore be asked and briefly examined whether the defendant is individually guilty of the criminal exploitation and enslavement of the nations of the East and perhaps of further crimes. What was his attitude, what were the general lines and general trends of his policy, what did he do positively, and what did he prevent or at least try to prevent?
In the Baltic countries, national administrations or directorates were installed under German supervision. The German administration was compelled by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories to show great understanding for all desires which could be fulfilled and strive for good relations with the Baltic countries; the Baltic countries had a free legal, educational, and cultural system and were only limited with respect to questions concerning politics, economy, and the police. After the war of 1914-18 agrarian reform in the Baltic states was carried out almost exclusively at the expense of the 700-year-old German holdings. Nevertheless Rosenberg, as minister for the East, made a law returning to private ownership the farms which had been made collective by the Soviet Union since 1940 and, by this restitution of soil which had originally been taken away from German proprietors, showed the greatest possible good will of the German Reich. This, as well as the already-mentioned agrarian program, has been expressly confirmed by the witness Riecke.
In the General District of White Ruthenia independent administration was initiated under Reich Commissioner Kube. The White Ruthenia Central Committee was founded, as well as a White Ruthenian relief system and a White Ruthenian youth organization. When a White Ruthenian youth delegation returned from a visit to Germany, Kube said that he would continue to act as a father to White Ruthenian youth; the following night he was murdered, yet this policy was not changed.
I should like to observe here in passing that the actual Russian territories between Narva and Leningrad and around Smolensk remained all the time under military administration; likewise the districts around Kharkov and the Crimea.
As far as the Ukraine is concerned, Rosenberg intended to give it extensive central self-administrative sovereignty, as soon as possible, similar to the directorates in the Baltic states and combined with a pronounced advancement of the cultural and educational needs of the people. After Rosenberg had originally considered himself entitled to assume that Hitler agreed with this idea, another conception later came to prevail, namely, that all forces should be directed toward the war economy. Rosenberg managed to achieve and carry through one thing only: The new agrarian program of 15 February 1942, which provided for a transition from the collective economy of the Soviet Union to private enterprise and then to ownership by the farmers. On 23 June 1943 the property decree was issued as a complement to this. At first it was not possible to carry this out because of Reich Commissioner Koch’s opposition, and then military events brought everything to an end. A further fundamental decree was based on a general adjustment of the school system, which Rosenberg had ordered to be worked out because the Reich Commissioner of the Ukraine declined to do it himself. Rosenberg provided for elementary schools and higher technical schools; the Reich Commissioner protested against this. On account of the conflict, which became more and more acute, between Rosenberg and Reich Commissioner Koch, Hitler in June 1943 issued the following written instruction: The Reich Commissioner had no right to make any obstructions, but the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories should confine himself to essential questions, and when issuing any orders should make it possible for the Reich Commissioner of the Ukraine to express his opinion beforehand, which practically meant Koch’s co-operation beside Rosenberg.
During his examination of 8 April 1946 the witness Lammers described Rosenberg’s peculiar constitutional position as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories and his political position, which became constantly weaker. I would like to emphasize the following striking and especially important declarations made by the witness: The authority of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories was detracted from by the Armed Forces, by Göring as the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, by Himmler as Chief of the German Police, by Himmler as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of Germandom (resettlement measures), by Sauckel as Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, by Speer in the field of armaments and engineering, and finally, through differences of opinion, by Propaganda Minister Goebbels.
Furthermore, Rosenberg was limited by the fact that two Reich Commissioners, Lohse and Koch, were appointed for the Occupied Eastern Territories. The Higher SS and Police Leader was “personally and directly” subordinated to the Reich Commissioner; but, as Lammers has declared, in technical respects he could not take any orders from Rosenberg or from the Reich Commissioner but only from Himmler.
Lammers said furthermore: Rosenberg always wished to pursue a moderate policy in the East; he was without any doubt against a policy of extermination and against a policy of deportation, which were widely advocated in other quarters. He made efforts to rebuild agriculture through the agrarian program, to put the educational system, church affairs, the universities and schools in order. Rosenberg had great difficulty in asserting himself, for especially the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine simply did not follow Rosenberg’s orders. Rosenberg favored instituting a certain degree of independence in the eastern nations; he particularly had at heart the cultural interests of the latter. The differences of opinion between Koch and Rosenberg, says Lammers, could have filled volumes of files. Hitler called Rosenberg and Koch to him and decided that they should meet each month in order to consult each other.
The witness Lammers said, quite rightly, that of Rosenberg as the superior minister it was asking too much to have to come to an agreement in each case with his subordinate, the Reich Commissioner. Subsequently it was shown that in spite of the meetings they came to no agreement, and finally it was Herr Koch who was right in the eyes of the Führer. As Lammers says it was about the end of 1943 that Rosenberg was received for the last time by the Führer, and even before that time he had always had great difficulties in reaching the Führer. There had been no more Reich Cabinet sessions since 1937.
Hitler’s ideas tended more and more in the direction of Bormann-Himmler. The East became the ground for experiments.