As the war became more and more intensified in regard to totality and brutality, the German workers, and the Germans altogether, did anything but live in a grand style; they too, as far as they had not been drafted for the Army, were assigned to labor duties, had to do heavy work for long hours, were separated from their families, had frequently to be content with second-rate billets—especially because of the increasing number of houses damaged by air attacks—and they, too, were severely punished for refusal to work or defaulting.
The fact that the foreign workers were likewise victims of this totality and brutality of the war and, admittedly, in some respects even more so, does not incriminate Rosenberg either legally or morally. He established, within his ministry, the Central Office for Nationals of the Eastern Territories, which had neither police tasks nor any other competencies of an administrative nature but was concerned solely with the welfare of nationals of the Eastern Territories and which employed trustees taken from among the eastern nations. In the report of 30 September 1942 (Document Number 084-PS, US-199) this office points out several inadequacies: That the accommodation, treatment, food, and pay of the Eastern Workers called forth strong criticism; that, though actually the situation was much better now (deadline 1 October 1942), the conditions for Eastern Workers were on the whole still far from being satisfactory. Rosenberg is therefore asked to discuss the matter with Hitler in order to have Hitler himself take energetic measures; Himmler was to be made to rescind his general regulations concerning the treatment of Eastern Workers; the Party Chancellery and the Party to be reminded of their historical responsibility for the millions of former Soviet citizens now guided by Germany and instructed to co-operate in all matters concerning Eastern Workers in the Reich with the Reich Minister; finally it was suggested to extend the scope of the Central Office for Nationals of the Eastern Territories as quickly as possible, so as to enable it efficiently to look after the interests of the aliens from the occupied territories living in the Reich, being, so to speak, the projected arm of the East ministry and the representative of these people. In this sense, namely, in the sense of social care and humane welfare, the eastern ministry was active for the Eastern Workers.
To refute the charge that Rosenberg was active as protagonist of the system of hatred and barbarism, of denying human rights, and of enslavement, I must add the following. Rosenberg received further unfavorable reports, one being the report of 7 October 1942 about the bad treatment of Ukrainian skilled workers (Document Number 054-PS, US-198). Abuses in recruiting and during transportation were pointed out; the workers were frequently dragged out of their beds at night and locked up in cellars until the time of their departure; threats and blows by the rural militia were a matter of course; food brought from home was often taken by the militia; during transportation to Germany neglect and transgressions on the part of the escorting units occurred, et cetera.
Rosenberg had no authority whatsoever to intervene in those matters, yet he tried to do so in a letter of 21 December 1942 to Sauckel; Rosenberg first emphasized his fundamental accord with Sauckel; but after a few tactical and polite clichés, he complained seriously and urgently about the methods used in the employment of labor. I quote:
“I must emphatically request, in view of my responsibility for the Occupied Eastern Territories, that in supplying the required quotas methods should be avoided which might one day cause me or my associates to be charged with connivance and with being responsible for the consequences.”
Rosenberg further states that he empowered the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine to make use, so far as required, of his sovereign rights and to give attention to the elimination of recruiting methods which were running counter to the interests of warfare and war economy in the occupied territories. He, Rosenberg, and the Reich Commissioners could not help being surprised that in numerous instances measures, which should have been previously agreed upon with the civilian authorities, were first learned of through the police or other offices. Without co-ordination of their mutual wishes Rosenberg was unfortunately unable to accept the joint responsibility for consequences resulting from these reported conditions. In conclusion Rosenberg expressed the wish to put an early end to such conditions for the sake of their common interest.
Rosenberg also tried personal consultations with Sauckel and got Sauckel to promise that he would do everything to bring about a fair solution of all these questions (conference of 14 April 1942). It was beyond Rosenberg’s power and authority to do more. His secret opponent, supported by higher authorities, was Reich Commissioner Koch, who was indeed one of the chief culprits responsible for the cruel methods of recruiting and employment of Eastern Workers, and whose influence Rosenberg was unable to counteract.
When the prosecutor (Brudno, on 9 January 1946) charges the defendant with protesting against these methods not for humanitarian reasons but out of political expediency, I can only say that in my opinion one cannot, without some sound reasons, simply maintain that the Defendant Rosenberg is devoid of any human qualities.
As an example of the defendant’s particular bestiality, the so-called “Hay Action” has been repeatedly pointed out by the Prosecution (Document Number 031-PS). It concerned the intention of Army Group Center to evacuate 40,000 to 50,000 juveniles from the area of operations, as they represented a considerable burden to the area of operations and were besides, for the most part, without any parental supervision. Villages for children were to be established behind the front lines under native supervision; one of these villages had already proven its value. It was hoped that through the Organization Todt, being a particularly appropriate organization due to its technical and other possibilities, the juveniles might, in the main, be placed at the disposal of German handicraft as apprentices, in order to employ them as skilled workers after 2 years’ training. At first Rosenberg, as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, was against this because he feared that the action might be considered as a deportation of children, while on the other hand, the juveniles did not represent a considerable increase of military strength. The chief of the political operations staff approached Rosenberg again, stating that Army Group Center attached particular importance to the fact that the children should enter the Reich, not by authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, but through the agency of the Reich Minister for the East, as it was felt that only then could they be assured of correct treatment. The Army Group wanted the action to be carried out under the most correct conditions and asked for special regulations to be issued with regard to mail facilities between them and their parents, et cetera. In the event of a possible reoccupation of the territory the eastern ministry could then let the children go back. Together with their parents they would certainly form a positive political element during the subsequent reconstruction of the territory.
Finally, as reason for the second request addressed to the minister, it was stated in addition that the children, to be sure, would not essentially contribute to strengthening the military power of the enemy but that the important factor in this case was the long-range weakening of his biological strength; not only the Reichsführer SS but also the Führer had expressed themselves to this effect. Rosenberg finally gave his consent to this action.