c. Selections from the Argumentation of the Defense
EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR DEFENDANT
BRACK[[151]]
The treatment of the question of responsibility for euthanasia in this room encounters great difficulties insofar as there is not only considerable ignorance of certain peculiarities of the German position in constitutional matters, but above all a great difference between the thinking of continental European and of transatlantic jurists on matters of constitutional statutory law. Law and morals have for centuries been sharply differentiated on the European continent in juristic and above all in legislative thinking in contrast to the states across the ocean. This historical fact must be taken into consideration, for only then can the realization be reached that in a question of German constitutional law only that development can be decisive which legal training has had in Germany in deviations from the constitutional law of the Weimar Republic, since the Enabling Act of 24 March 1933 and the Head of the State Law of 1 August 1934.
With these laws Hitler was given all authority as head of the state and chief of the government, in full recognition of the Fuehrer principle which had been in operation for over a year, with approval by the plebiscite of 19 August 1934.
From this time on Hitler incorporated the will of the people, and the resulting functions. He had thus become the Supreme Legislator of the Reich. A concluding resolution of the Reichstag was only the confirmation of his primary declaration of his will.
Among the independent promulgations of laws, which were represented as direct emanations of his authority, the declarations of Hitler’s will which were at first called “decrees” and later uniformly “Fuehrer decrees” assumed the most important role. In them the distinction, still customary under the Weimar constitution, between legislative and executive is overcome, as Hitler proclaimed in his Reichstag speech of 30 January 1937 in the words: “There is only one legislative power and one executive.”
Therefore the decrees united material law with organizational measures and administrative directives, especially insofar as they were addressed only to a group of persons gathered together in a certain community. Proclamation in the Reich Law Gazette [Reichsgesetzblatt], countersigned by the competent departmental minister, and later the competent chancellery chief, no longer played a decisive role in 1937. The Fuehrer principle was already in full operation at this time. It no longer tolerated the dependence of the authority to promulgate original laws which was granted to the Fuehrer by the plebiscite of 1934 on the observance of formal regulations. The only decisive thing that remained was the fact of the proclamation of the will of the Fuehrer, not its form. Hitler’s Decree of 1 September 1939 concerning euthanasia, addressed to Brandt and Bouhler, was therefore in form a legally quite acceptable act of government of the head of the state.
My conclusions from the examination of the development in legal history of the Fuehrer principle in the Third Reich agrees with the testimony of the witnesses Lammers,[[152]] Engert, and Best. This testimony is underlined by the standpoint of the Reich Minister of Justice Guertner and by Schlegelberger as representatives of supreme Reich authorities, as transmitted to us by Lammers and Engert. Finally, it is affirmed by University Professor Dr. Hermann Jahrreiss, who a few days ago dealt with the questions arising in this connection in great detail and exhaustively in the Justice Case before Military Tribunal III.[[153]] I may ask the Tribunal in judging this legal question to consider these statements.