* * * It is the most fundamental tenet of medical ethics and human decency that the subjects volunteer for the experiment after being informed of its nature and hazards. This is a clear dividing line between the criminal and what may be noncriminal. If the experimental subjects cannot be said to have volunteered, then the inquiry need proceed no further. Such is the simplicity of this case.
What then is a volunteer? If one has a fertile imagination, suppositious cases might be put which would require a somewhat refined judgment. No such problem faces this Tribunal. The proof is overwhelming that there was never the slightest pretext of using volunteers. It was for the very reason that volunteers could not be expected to undergo the murderous experiments which are the subject of this trial that these defendants turned to the inexhaustible pool of miserable and oppressed prisoners in the concentration camps. Can anyone seriously believe that Poles, Jews, and Russians, or even Germans, voluntarily submitted themselves to the tortures of the decompression chamber and freezing basin in Dachau, the poison gas chamber in Natzweiler, or the sterilization X-ray machines of Auschwitz? Is it to be held that the Polish girls in Ravensbrueck gave their unfettered consent to be mutilated and killed for the glory of the Third Reich? Was the miserable gypsy who assaulted the defendant Beiglboeck in this very courtroom a voluntary participant in the sea-water experiments? Did the hundreds of victims of the murderous typhus stations in Buchenwald and Natzweiler by any stretch of the imagination consent to those experiments? The preponderance of the proof leaves no doubt whatever as to the answer to these questions. The testimony of experimental subjects, eyewitnesses, and the documents of the defendant’s own making, establish beyond a shadow of a doubt that these experimental subjects were nonvolunteers in every sense of the word.
This fact is not seriously denied by the defendants. Most of them who performed the experiments themselves have admitted that they never so much as asked the subjects whether they were volunteering for the experiments. As to the legal and moral necessity for consent, the defendants pay theoretical lip service, while at the same time leaving the back door ajar for a hasty retreat. Thus, it is said that the totalitarian “State” assumed the responsibility for the designation of the experimental subjects, and under such circumstances the men who planned, ordered, performed, or otherwise participated in the experiment cannot be held criminally responsible even though nonvolunteers were tortured and killed as a result. This was perhaps brought out most clearly as a result of questions put to the defendant Karl Brandt by the Tribunal. When asked his view of an experiment, which was assumed to have been of highest military necessity and of an involuntary character with resultant deaths, Brandt replied:
“In this case I am of the opinion that, considering the circumstances of the situation of the war, this state institution, which has laid down the importance of the interest of the state, at the same time takes the responsibility away from the physician if such an experiment ends fatally, and such responsibility must then be borne by the state.” (Tr. p. 2567.)
Further questioning elicited the opinion that the only man possibly responsible in this suppositious case was Himmler, who had the power of life and death over concentration camp inmates, even though the experiment may have been ordered, for example, by the Chief of the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe and executed by doctors subordinated to him. Most of the other defendants took a similar position, that they had no responsibility in the selection of the experimental subjects.
This defense is, in the view of the prosecution, completely spurious. The use of involuntary subjects in a medical experiment is a crime, and if it results in death it is the crime of murder. Any party to the experiment is guilty of murder and that guilt cannot be escaped by having a third person supply the victims. The person planning, ordering, supporting, or executing the experiment is under a duty, both moral and legal, to see to it that the experiment is properly performed. This duty cannot be delegated. It is surely incumbent on the doctor performing the experiment to satisfy himself that the subjects volunteered after having been informed of the nature and hazards of the experiment. If they are not volunteers, it is his duty to report to his superiors and discontinue the experiment. These defendants have competed with each other in feigning complete ignorance about the consent of the experimental victims. They knew, as the evidence proves, that the miserable inmates did not volunteer to be tortured and killed. But even assuming the impossible, that they did not know, it is their damnation not their exoneration. Knowledge could have been obtained by the simple expedient of asking the subjects. The duty of inquiry could not be clearer and cannot be avoided by such lame excuses as “I understood they were volunteers,” or, “Himmler assured me they were volunteers.”
In this connection, it should never be lost sight of that these experiments were performed in concentration camps on concentration camp inmates. However little, some of these defendants say they knew of the lawless jungles which were concentration camps, where violent death, torture, and starvation made up the daily life of the inmates, they at least knew that they were places of terror where all persons opposed to the Nazi government were imprisoned without trial, where Jews and Poles and other so-called “racial inferiors” were incarcerated for no crime whatever, unless their race or religion be a crime. These simple facts were known during the war to people all over the world. How much greater then was the duty of these defendants to determine very carefully the voluntary character of these experimental subjects who were so conveniently available. True it is that these defendants are not charged with responsibility for the manifold complex of crimes which made up the concentration camp system. But it cannot be held that they could enter the gates of the Inferno and say in effect: “Bring forward the subjects. I see no evil; I hear no evil; I speak no evil.” They asked no questions. They did not inquire of the inmates as to such details as consent, nationality, whether a trial had been held, what crime had been committed, and the like. They did not because they knew that the wretched inmates did not volunteer for their experiments and were not expected to volunteer. They embraced the Nazi doctrines and the Nazi way of life. The things these defendants did were the result of the noxious merger of German militarism and Nazi racial objectives. When, in the face of a critical shortage of typhus vaccines to protect the Wehrmacht in its Eastern invasions, Handloser and his cohorts decided that animal experimentation was too slow, the inmates of Buchenwald were sacrificed by the hundreds to test new vaccines. When Schroeder wanted to determine the limit of human tolerance of sea-water, he trod the path well-worn by the Luftwaffe to Dachau and got forty gypsies. These defendants with their eyes open used the oppressed and persecuted victims of the Nazi regime to wring from their wretched and unwilling bodies a drop of scientific information at a cost of death, torture, mutilation, and permanent disability. For these palpable crimes justice demands stern retribution.