Immediately after Weltz had completed his negotiations with Ruff, he called a meeting at his institute in Munich, wherein discussions of a technical nature concerning the experiments were held. At this meeting, Ruff, Romberg, Rascher, and Weltz were in attendance. This meeting was at Weltz’ Institute and Weltz presided over the meeting. It was further decided that a second meeting was to be held at Dachau a few days later in order to make the necessary arrangements with the camp commander. This trip took place in order to discuss technical preparations with the camp commander, and to arrange details concerning the selection of the experimental subjects. Again, Weltz, Ruff, Romberg, and Rascher were in attendance, in addition to Piorkowski, the camp commander, and Schnitzler of the staff of the Reichsfuehrung SS. (NO-476, Pros. Ex. 40; NO-437, Pros. Ex. 42; NO-263, Pros. Ex. 47; Tr. pp. 7086-7.)
After the arrangements with the camp authorities at Dachau had been completed, the shipment of the low-pressure chamber from Berlin was the next problem to overcome. As pointed out earlier, Weltz desired the low-pressure chamber which was possessed by Ruff and Romberg for use in the experiments at Dachau. It is interesting to note that Weltz had had a low-pressure chamber available in his own institute from 1938 on (Tr. p. 7178.), and that Weltz testified that volunteers from his student body or from the Luftwaffe were available. (Tr. pp. 7180-83.) Despite this, it was necessary to resort to the concentration camp for inmates and, in order to conduct the experiments, a mobile pressure chamber had to be brought down from the Ruff Institute in Berlin, as the low-pressure chamber in the Weltz Institute was not mobile. The mobile low-pressure chamber from Ruff’s Institute at Berlin was driven to Weltz’ Institute in Munich and arrived in the late afternoon. This chamber was driven to Munich by employees of the DVL and turned over to Weltz. On the following day, SS drivers came from Dachau, received the keys to the chamber and drove it to the concentration camp. (Tr. p. 7199.) The purpose in camouflaging this activity was to deceive the employees of the DVL because Weltz and Ruff did not want them to know that the low-pressure chamber was to be used in an experimental program at a concentration camp. This is borne out by the fact that a completely new set of drivers came from the concentration camp to take the chamber to Dachau. This particular action of secrecy is noticeable when it is considered that Dachau is merely 12 kilometers from Munich and actually the DVL drivers had to go out of their way to deliver the chamber to the Weltz Institute. Ruff testified that the secrecy in the transfer of the chamber to Dachau was for security reasons. (Tr. p. 6550.)
From the evidence thus far summarized, and indeed from Weltz’ own admission, it is clear that he must be found guilty of the high-altitude crimes committed in Dachau. This was a criminal undertaking from its inception. It was known to all concerned that the proposed experiments were certain to result in deaths and that they were to be performed on nonvolunteers. That is proved by the very first letter to Himmler. Weltz supported the ambition of his subordinate, Rascher, to perform the experiments on behalf of the Weltz Institute. He secured the collaboration of Ruff and Romberg. He obtained the consent of Hippke and a research assignment from the Referat for Aviation Medicine under Anthony and Becker-Freyseng. He took care of the technical arrangements and participated in conferences with Ruff, Romberg, and Rascher which decided on the experiments to be performed. Weltz did more in having the experiments performed than anyone else. His guilt is clearly established on this evidence alone. It is not disputed that Rascher was subordinated to him until February 1942. Weltz’ main defense is that he had Rascher transferred from his institute late in February 1942 and, hence, cannot be held responsible for what happened thereafter. Even if true, this is no defense. Weltz had long since participated in the criminal enterprise. He cannot be heard to say that “Yes, I did all that, but I’m not responsible for the actual consequences which my acts were expected to bring about.” The deaths which occurred in these experiments were foreseeable from the beginning. Weltz does not escape responsibility for those deaths, even if it were true that Rascher was not subordinated to him when they occurred. But that is not true, as the evidence proves.
The actual date of the commencement of the experiments at Dachau was 22 February 1942, which was recalled by the witness Neff because it was his birthday. (Tr. p. 606.) From this point on, the defendant Weltz takes the position that he had no knowledge of the work and that, in fact, Rascher was relieved from his command. Weltz admitted that it was his obligation to supervise Rascher and that the existing arrangement between Ruff and Weltz was that this was to be a joint undertaking. Ruff exercised supervision over Romberg, and Weltz was to exercise supervision over Rascher. Weltz conceded that he was Rascher’s disciplinary superior and was responsible for the scientific programs to which he assigned Rascher. (Tr. p. 7088.) Despite this chain of command and working agreement, Weltz takes the position that Rascher endeavored to work independently and that he did not desire to report to Weltz. (Tr. pp. 7088-9.) It became necessary for Weltz to order Rascher to report to him twice a week and, as a result of this order, Weltz alleges that Rascher came to him in the middle of February and that they had their first conversation since the meeting in Dachau and on that occasion, Rascher informed Weltz that the experiments had not even started yet and that he had nothing to report. (Tr. p. 7089.)
Weltz testified that Anthony, under whom Becker-Freyseng worked in the Luftwaffe Medical Inspectorate, in Berlin, telephoned him to inquire how the Dachau experiments were progressing and that he could only reply that nothing had been reported to him. Rascher reported to him for the second time, whereupon Weltz informed Rascher that a telephone call had come through from Berlin and that he wanted to have some clarification as to how things stood at Dachau. Rascher did not want to report anything to Weltz at the second conversation, and Weltz maintains that he told Rascher that he was going to Berlin to clear up the situation and obtain a clear decision whether or not Rascher was to report to him. Then, on the occasion of the third visit from Rascher, Weltz, expecting a sharp argument, asked Wendt of his office to come into the room, and on that occasion he confronted Rascher with the alternative either to report to him or to leave the institute. Weltz asserts that at that time Rascher showed him a telegram from Himmler, which read: “Experiments are to be kept secret from everyone.” (Tr. p. 7089.) Thereupon, Weltz maintains that he ordered Rascher from his institute and that he then composed a letter, together with Wendt, to the Luftgau and asked for Rascher’s immediate transfer and that within a few days Rascher’s assignment had ended. (Tr. p. 7090.)
The memorandum of Nini Rascher to Himmler of 24 February 1942 shows that at that time Rascher was still subordinate to Weltz. (NO-263, Pros. Ex. 47.) She reviewed the history of the experiments and pointed out that on 24 July 1941 Rascher, Kottenhoff, and Weltz were to be in charge. Kottenhoff was transferred to Romania in August and thereby excluded from the group. She stated that it was Weltz’s task to initiate the technical execution of the experiments. Apparently because of a fear of moral objections on the part of Hippke, Weltz had postponed the beginning of the experiments but had finally secured Ruff and Romberg to collaborate with Rascher. A conference took place in Dachau between Piorkowski, Schnitzler, Weltz, Rascher, Romberg, and Ruff. Weltz had given the assurance that he would take care of the authorization for Rascher. Mrs. Rascher complained that on 18 February, after Rascher had carried out all the preparatory work, Weltz stated: “Now that you have removed all obstacles from the path of Romberg with the SS, the authorization must be handled differently.” Mrs. Rascher stated that both Romberg and Rascher agreed that Weltz was not needed anymore and that both opposed his attempts to oust Rascher in favor of himself.
Weltz contended that the truth of the matter was that he wished to get rid of Rascher, and that Mrs. Rascher had misrepresented this to Himmler so that it would appear that he was trying to eliminate Rascher in order to keep the work exclusively to himself. (Tr. p. 7099.) There can be no question that Mrs. Rascher was quite correct in her analysis of the situation. What possible reason could Weltz have for desiring, just before the experiments began, to eliminate Rascher unless he wished to participate himself personally and thus secure a larger share of the scientific credit? Certainly he had supported Rascher from the very inception of the proposal to perform the experiments. Be that as it may, the proof shows that Rascher continued to participate in the experiments as a subordinate of Weltz. This is clearly proved by a file memorandum of Schnitzler of the SS office in Munich, dated 28 April 1942. (NO-264, Pros. Ex. 60.) This memorandum shows that Rascher was still subordinated to Weltz, and that Weltz was insisting on active participation in the experiments and full responsibility. The RLM [Reich Air Ministry] had inquired of Weltz how long the experiments would last, and whether it was justifiable to detail a medical officer for so long. Rascher, who was chafing under his subordination to Weltz, requested that his assignment be changed to the DVL [German Aviation Research Institute], Dachau Branch.
Weltz’ only reaction to this document was that the date was wrong and should read 28 February 1942 instead of 28 April 1942. (Tr. p. 7099 ff.) Weltz conceded on cross-examination that, assuming the date 28 April 1942 was correct, then of course Rascher was still his subordinate at that time. (Tr. p. 7232.) The file memorandum of Sievers dated 3 May 1942 settled this question beyond any doubt. This memorandum reads as follows:
“SS Untersturmfuehrer Stabsarzt Dr. Rascher reported in Munich on 29 April 1942 about the result of the conference with Oberstabsarzt Dr. Weltz. Weltz requested that Dr. Rascher be withdrawn if by Friday, 1 May 1942 he (Weltz) were not taken into consultation regarding the experiments. The Reich Leader SS was informed accordingly. He ordered SS Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff on 30 April 1942 to send a telegram to Field Marshal Milch requesting that Dr. Rascher be ordered to the German Aviation Research Institute [Deutsche Versuchsanstalt fuer Luftfahrt], Dachau Branch, and there to be at the disposal of the Reich Leader SS.” (NO-1359, Pros. Ex. 493.)
After having been confronted with this document Weltz in effect conceded that his previous testimony about the transfer of Rascher had been, to say the least of it, incorrect. He said: