The Sulfanilamide Experiments
Of all medical experiments forming the subjects of the indictment, the experiments for testing sulfanilamides were undoubtedly the most directly connected with the war. The problem of wound infection is one with which every nation at war must concern itself especially in modern warfare. This problem is not only one of great importance to the life and health of the individual wounded soldier, but it may have a decisive effect on the strategical position and on the outcome of the war itself through the resultant gaps in the ranks. Already the First World War showed that the majority of soldiers do not die on the battlefield itself and that in most cases death is not the direct result of a wound, but that the heavy losses must be attributed to infection of wounds received. These experiences have been confirmed in the Second World War and the special conditions prevailing in Russia and the climatic conditions due to the winter there have shown even more than in the First World War that wound infection was a medical and tactical problem of the highest importance for the troops and their health. As regards details, I refer to statements made in this connection on the witness stand by several defendants in these proceedings.
Consequently, it could not come as a surprise that in this war, too, efforts were made to deal with wound infection not only by using surgical measures, but that a way was sought to prevent the formation and spreading of bacterial infections or at least to confine them within reasonable limits by using chemical preparations.
Such efforts seemed the more called for as the war in the East not only meant an immense strain on the resources in material and personnel in general, but also in view of the fact that especially the supply of the army troops and the Waffen SS with medical officers and, above all, with trained field surgeons became more and more difficult. Had it been possible to assist the field medical officers at the front and at the main dressing stations with a reliable and effective chemo-therapeutic preparation against bacterial wound infection, progress of vast importance would have been achieved.
On the other hand, however, it was impossible to overlook the fact that the introduction of a chemo-therapeutic preparation which did not operate safely involved a certain amount of danger to an effective medical care of the wounded and consequently to the war potential of the wounded and consequently to the war potential of the German Wehrmacht and its striking power. In his lecture on the chemo-therapy of wound infection as delivered before the First Conference East of the Consulting Specialists on 18 May 1943, which I submitted as part of the report dealing with this conference, (Gebhardt, Fischer, Oberheuser 1, Gebhardt, Fischer, Oberheuser Ex. 6.) Professor Dr. Rostock referred to the great danger of chemo-therapy, i. e., the possibility “of making negligent physicians careless in the surgical aspect of wound dressing, since they may place a certain trust in chemo-therapy.”
This warning was all the more in order since, at that time there was not only complete uncertainty as regards the effects of sulfanilamides, but also because there was a divergence in opinions as to the efficacy of this preparation. It has been clearly shown by the evidence that, in spite of close observation of the effects of sulfanilamides in peace time and in war, it was impossible to answer this question. Opinions were very much divided. While some were convinced of the efficacy of these preparations in connection with wound infections, and ascribed extraordinarily good results to them, others were of the opinion that these chemical preparations could at the best be used as a supplement and that if used by themselves, they did not have the properties to prevent bacterial infection resulting from combat wounds. With regard to the details I refer to the statements of the defendants Karl Brandt, Handloser, Rostock, Gebhardt, and Fischer and to Gebhardt Exhibits 6, 7, and 10 as submitted by me during the hearing of the evidence.
In this respect, it is highly interesting to review the scientific discussions of the consulting specialists as contained in the report on the First Conference East on 18 and 19 May 1942. (Gebhardt, Fischer, Oberheuser 1, Gebhardt, Fischer, Oberheuser Ex. 6.) These discussions which took place prior to the sulfanilamide experiments comprising the subject of the indictment give a true picture of the situation as it was at that time with regard to the efficacy of sulfanilamides.
In this respect we are able to distinguish three sharply defined groups. In the group which rejected the chemo-therapeutic treatment of wound infection, Geheimrat Professor Sauerbruch was the leader. He emphatically voiced the opinion that these chemical preparations tend to obscure surgical work and to lead to perfunctory treatment. He requested that the preparations should be critically tested, that is to say, the test should be made by surgeons experienced in general surgery.
In the other camp there were surgeons who claimed to have obtained extraordinarily favorable results in the chemo-therapeutical treatment of bacterially infected wounds. Among them was Dr. Krueger, the Berlin professor of surgery, who claimed to have observed a favorable effect of sulfanilamide in as many as 5,000 cases.
To the third group belonged the surgeons, bacteriologists, and pathologists who took the view that nothing definite could be said as yet as to the effects and the efficacy of sulfanilamides as agents in the fight against bacterially infected wounds and that further tests along these lines would have to be made.