War crimes are defined in Law No. 10 as atrocities or offenses in violation of the laws or customs of war. This definition is based primarily upon the Hague Convention of 1907 and the Geneva Convention of 1929, which declare the law of nations at those times with respect to land warfare, the treatment of prisoners of war, the rights and duties of a belligerent power when occupying territory of a hostile state, and other matters. The laws and customs of war apply between belligerents, but not domestically or among allies. Crimes by German nationals against other German nationals are not war crimes, nor are acts by German nationals against Hungarians or Romanians. The war crimes charged in this indictment all occurred after 1 September 1939, and it is therefore unnecessary to consider the somewhat narrow limitation of the scope of war crimes by the International Military Tribunal to acts committed after the outbreak of war. One might argue that the occupations of Austria and the Sudetenland in 1938, and of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, were sufficiently similar to a state of belligerency to bring the laws of war into effect, but such questions are academic for purposes of this case.
In connection with the charge of crimes against humanity, it is also anticipated that an argument will be made by the defense to the effect that crimes committed by German nationals against other German nationals cannot constitute crimes against humanity as defined by Article II of Control Council Law No. 10 and hence are not within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. The evidence of the prosecution has proved that in substantially all of the experiments prisoners of war or civilians from German-occupied territories were used as subjects. This proof stands uncontradicted save by general statements of the defendants that they were told by Himmler or some unidentified person that the experimental subjects were all German criminals or that the subjects all spoke fluent German. Thus, for the most part, the acts here in issue constitute war crimes and hence, at the same time, crimes against humanity. Certainly there has been no proof whatever that an order was ever issued restricting the experimental subjects to German criminals as distinguished from non-German nationals. If, in this or that minor instance, the proof has not disclosed the precise nationality of the unfortunate victims or has even shown them to be Germans, we may rest assured that it was merely a chance occurrence.
Be that as it may, the prosecution does not wish to ignore a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal even though it is of minor importance to this case. One thing should be made clear at the outset: We are not here concerned with any question as to jurisdiction over crimes committed before 1 September 1939, whether against German nationals or otherwise. That subject has been mooted and is in issue in another case now on trial, but the crimes in this case all occurred after the war began.
Moreover, we are not concerned with the question whether crimes against humanity must have been committed “in execution of or in connection with any crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.” The International Military Tribunal construed its Charter as requiring that crimes against humanity be committed in execution of, or in connection with, the crime of aggressive war. Whatever the merit of that holding, the language of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal which led to it is not included in the definition of crimes against humanity in Control Council Law No. 10. There can be no doubt that crimes against humanity as defined in Law No. 10 stand on an independent footing and constitute crimes per se. In any event, the crimes with which this case is concerned were in fact all “committed in execution of, or in connection with, the aggressive war.” This is true not only of the medical experiments, but also of the Euthanasia Program, pursuant to which a large number of non-German nationals were killed. The judgment of the International Military Tribunal expressly so holds.[[125]]
Thus, it is clear that the only issue which is raised in this case as to crimes against humanity is whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction over crimes committed by Germans against Germans. Does the definition of crimes against humanity in Control Council Law No. 10 comprehend crimes by Germans against Germans of the type with which this case is concerned? The provisions of Law No. 10 are binding upon the Tribunal as the law to be applied to the case.[[126]] The provisions of Section 1(c) of Article II are clear and unambiguous. Crimes against humanity are there defined as—
“Atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.” [Emphasis supplied.]
The words “any civilian population” cannot possibly be construed to exclude German civilians. If Germans are deemed to be excluded, there is little or nothing left to give purpose to the concept of crimes against humanity. War crimes include all acts listed in the definition of crimes against humanity when committed against prisoners of war and the civilian population of occupied territory. The only remaining significant groups are Germans and nationals of the satellite countries, such as Hungary or Romania. It is one of the very purposes of the concept of crimes against humanity, not only as set forth in Law No. 10 but also as long recognized by international law, to reach the systematic commission of atrocities and offenses by a state against its own people. The concluding phrase of the definition of crimes against humanity, which is in the alternative, makes it quite clear that crimes by Germans against Germans are within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. It reads “or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.” This reference to “domestic laws” can only mean discriminatory and oppressive legislation directed against a state’s own people, as for example, the Nuernberg Laws against German Jews. [Emphasis supplied.]
The matter is put quite beyond doubt by Article III of Law No. 10 which authorizes each of the occupying powers to arrest persons suspected of having committed crimes defined in Law No. 10, and to bring them to trial “before an appropriate tribunal.” Paragraph 1(d) of Article III further provides that—
“Such Tribunal may, in the case of crimes committed by persons of German citizenship or nationality against other persons of German citizenship or nationality, or stateless persons, be a German court, if authorized by the occupying authorities.”