The Punishable Crime Against Humanity
The criminality of the crime against humanity is based on Law No. 10 of the Control Council for Germany. Article II of this law states—
“1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime:
c. Crime against humanity * * *.”
The concept of the crime against humanity has not been established and it is questionable whether crimes against humanity according to Law No. 10 also refer to such acts as have been committed on German nationals by German nationals. The decision of this question is of particular significance since the medical experiments with which the defendants are charged and the mercy killings executed were, in the first place, carried out on German nationals.
The question here is not to establish whether such acts are against humanity but whether they are crimes against humanity punishable according to Law No. 10 which were committed knowingly and willfully. If measures taken against German nationals do not come under the law, the evidence of the prosecution to be examined is restricted mainly to those cases in which certain foreigners were affected, and in addition, evidence must be produced proving that the defendant was aware of the fact that foreigners too had actually been involved by these measures.
It is to be understood from Law No. 10 that it is merely an implementation law to the London Agreement of 8 August 1945 and the statute belonging to it. This has been expressly stressed in the introduction, and beyond that the London Statute and the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 have been declared inseparable components of the law according to Article I.
The legally pre-eminent London Statute therefore is decisive for the interpretation of the substantive law. Article 6(c) of this statute provides that crimes against humanity can be considered punishable only if they were committed “in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal * * *”. This jurisdiction, however, extends only to crimes against peace and to war crimes. The punishable crime against humanity, therefore, is restricted to the latter. The prosecution, however, has only recently championed a different opinion. In Case 5 before Tribunal IV, the case against Flick and others,[[129]] the prosecution declared in its opening statement on 19 April 1947 that the clause: “in connection with a crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal” has a different meaning from what it expresses. The clause is to signify that the Tribunal is not to deal with individual crimes but only with such crimes as have been committed on a large scale and are therefore within the jurisdiction of the trial.
This meaning of the clause was not apparent to the International Military Tribunal, the prosecutors of the signatory powers at that time, nor to those who later commented on the verdict, and I do not believe that one can agree with the newly established interpretation of the prosecution. The decision of the International Military Tribunal is authoritative for the interpretation since it was pronounced by the judges of the signatory powers who were expressly appointed for application of the new law. The high authority of the International Military Tribunal is emphasized by Ordinance 7, Article X, according to which its actual findings are binding for the later courts.