The charge stated that Yamashita, between 9 October 1944 and 2 September 1945, in the Philippine Islands, “while commander of armed forces of Japan at war with the United States of America and its Allies, unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against people of the United States and of its Allies and dependencies, particularly the Philippines; and he * * * thereby violated the laws of war.” The military commission[[142]] which tried Yamashita found that atrocities and other high crimes had been committed by members of the Japanese Armed Forces under his command, that they were not sporadic in nature but in many cases were methodically supervised by Japanese officers, and that during the period in question Yamashita failed to provide effective control of his troops as was required by the circumstances. The Supreme Court stated the question for their decision in the following language:
“It is not denied that such acts directed against the civilian population of an occupied country and against prisoners of war are recognized in international law as violations of the law of war * * *. But it is urged that the charge does not allege that petitioner has either committed or directed the commission of such acts, and consequently that no violation is charged against him. But this overlooks the fact that the gist of the charge is an unlawful breach of duty by the petitioner as an army commander to control the operations of the members of his command by ‘permitting them to commit’ the extensive and widespread atrocities specified. The question then is whether the law of war imposes on an army commander a duty to take such appropriate measures as are within his power to control the troops under his command for the prevention of the specified acts which are violations of the law of war and which are likely to attend the occupation of hostile territory by an uncontrolled soldiery, and whether he may be charged with personal responsibility for his failure to take such measures when violations result.”
The Court held that the charge was sufficient and that the law of war “plainly imposed on petitioner, who at the time specified was military governor of the Philippines, as well as commander of the Japanese forces, an affirmative duty to take such measures as were within his power and appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian population. This duty of a commanding officer has heretofore been recognized, and its breach penalized by our own military tribunals.”
This decision is squarely in point as to the criminal responsibility of those defendants in this dock who had the power and authority to control the agents through whom these crimes were committed. It is not incumbent upon the prosecution to show that this or that defendant was familiar with all of the details of all of these experiments. Indeed, in the Yamashita case, there was no charge or proof that he had knowledge of the crimes. In the case before the International Military Tribunal, proof was submitted that the Reichsbank, of which the defendant Funk was president, had received from the SS the personal belongings of victims who had been exterminated in concentration camps. In that connection the Tribunal said in its judgment:
“Funk has protested that he did not know that the Reichsbank was receiving articles of this kind. The Tribunal is of the opinion that he either knew what was being received or was deliberately closing his eyes to what was being done.”[[143]]
But we need not discuss the requirement of knowledge on the facts of this case. It has been repeatedly proved that those responsible leaders of the German medical services in this dock not only knew of the systematic and criminal use of concentration camp inmates for murderous medical experiments, but also actively participated in such crimes. Can it be held that Karl Brandt had no knowledge of these crimes when he personally initiated the jaundice experiments by Dohmen in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp and the phosgene experiments of Bickenbach? Can it be found that he knew nothing of the criminal Euthanasia Program when he was charged by Hitler with its execution? Can it be said that Handloser had no knowledge when he participated in the conference of 29 December 1941 where it was decided to perform the Buchenwald typhus crimes, when reports were given on criminal experiments at meetings called and presided over by him? Was Rostock an island of ignorance when he arranged the program for and presided over the meetings at which Gebhardt and Fischer lectured on their sulfanilamide experiments, when he classified as “urgent” the criminal research of Hirt, Haagen, and Bickenbach? Did Schroeder lack knowledge when he personally requested Himmler to supply him with inmates for the sea-water experiments? Can it be found that Genzken had no knowledge of these crimes when the miserable Dr. Ding was subordinated to and received orders from him in connection with the typhus experiments in Buchenwald, when his office supplied Rascher with equipment for the freezing experiments? Was Blome insufficiently informed in the face of proof that he collaborated with Rascher in the blood coagulation experiments, issued a research assignment to him on freezing experiments and to Hirt on the gas experiments, as well as performed bacteriological warfare and poison experiments himself?
No, it was not lack of information as to the criminal program which explains the culpable failure of these men to destroy this Frankenstein’s monster. Nor was it lack of power. Can anyone doubt that Karl Brandt could have issued instructions to Handloser and Conti that doctors subordinated to them were not to experiment on concentration camp inmates? It is no excuse to say that Hitler and Himmler approved the policy and that his efforts may have failed. Certainly they approved it. But the fact is that Brandt also approved of and personally participated in the program. He was the “highest Reich authority” in the medical services, not Himmler. The medical services were Brandt’s primary function, while Himmler had a few other tasks to keep him busy, such as running the SS, the Ministry of Interior, the German Police, and the Home Army, to mention a few.
Nothing could have been easier for Handloser than to issue a general directive that officers of the Medical Services of the Wehrmacht were to keep out of concentration camps. If he could not have done so, then we must conclude that no one could have. Handloser had no peer in the military medical services. And what Handloser could have done for all the branches of the Wehrmacht, Schroeder, Genzken, and Blome could have done with respect to the Luftwaffe, the Waffen SS, and the Reich Health Department.
The conclusion is inescapable that the crimes of these responsible leaders is a hundredfold greater than that of the wretches who executed the murderous experiments in the concentration camps. Theirs was the power, the opportunity, and the duty to control and their failure is their everlasting guilt.