“Keitel [as Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces] did not have command authority over the three Wehrmacht branches * * *.”[[148]]

From this the prosecution should have drawn the logical conclusion that, if the superior of Handloser, Keitel, had no powers of command over the three branches of the armed forces and their supreme commanders, then Professor Handloser, as his subordinate, also could have had no powers of command over the medical chiefs attached to the staff of the supreme commanders. The evidence has corroborated this. (Tr. pp. 2860-3, 3129-30, 3219, 3557.)

The prosecution refers for proof of the contrary only to the statement of the former Air Force Chief Hippke in another trial. According to that Hippke is supposed to have testified that Professor Handloser had been his professional superior. The incorrectness of this statement is proved by the opposing testimonies given under oath by Professor Dr. Schroeder who succeeded Hippke and of Generalarzt Dr. Hartleben (Tr. pp. 3219-20, 3225), as well as of Generalarzt Dr. Wuerfler (Tr. pp. 3129-30). The evidence submitted, combined with the contents of the decree of 1942, has shown that it was the duty of the Chief of the Armed Forces Medical Service to direct the adjustment of personnel and material affairs within the branch of the armed forces as is evidenced by the first sentence of the decree. Within the scope of this sphere of duties, Professor Handloser was charged with the combination or—as it was generally called—the coordination of all common problems in the field of the Armed Forces Medical Service. The task of coordination given Professor Handloser did not mean that thereby all common problems automatically came under his jurisdiction. It was rather his duty to examine which part of the immense medical service was suitable for coordination. Generalarzt Dr. Wuerfler has aptly called this a “program of future fields of endeavor”. In this connection see also Professor Schroeder (Tr. pp. 3557, 3558). Whenever Handloser thought that a certain department was suitable for coordination, he tried to reach an agreement with the medical chiefs of the branches of the armed forces; for since he had no powers of command, the coordination could only take place in conjunction with the medical chiefs. After coordination had been accomplished, he was empowered to issue “directives” in this field which did not have the character of an order. Hartleben replies to the question of my colleague Dr. Steinbauer:

“Directives give general guiding principles, an order must be carried out to the letter.”

Wuerfler expresses the same in the following manner:

“A superior has the authority to give orders. One can only speak of a right to issue directives where there exists no authority to give orders and no relationship of superiority.”

Research is a field which by its nature is unsuitable for coordination. For, while it is possible to alleviate personnel and material deficiencies in the personnel and material fields of the medical service by coordination, or in other words to achieve a practical useful effect, such is not the case with respect to research. The prosecution also questioned Professor Rostock regarding the problem of coordination in the field of research and argued that through such a coordination, that is to say, such a concentration of research activities which were carried on in various places, personnel and material could be allocated more effectively. Professor Rostock has made some remarks on this account which are of fundamental importance because they disprove the thesis of the prosecution with objectively convincing reasons. According to him, many conditions in the military and medical fields are suitable for coordination, while research cannot be coordinated. It is better for the aim in view when several scientists work on the same research subject, than if only one office were engaged in this activity. Professor Rostock says quite rightly:

“If someone were to say to me, give this matter all your attention, and the same thing is being worked on at this place and that, then, in all probability, I should have looked for reasons why it was necessary for both places to be doing the same thing.”

And again:

“I would regard it as an absolute mistake to say to one scientist: You are not allowed to work on that any longer, the other one is working on that * * *.” (Tr. p. 3352.)