“In preparing counts II and III of the indictment, the prosecution elected to frame its pleadings in such a manner [page 7 of the original] as to charge all defendants with the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, generally, and at the same time to name in each subparagraph dealing with medical experiments only those defendants particularly charged with responsibility for each particular item.”
The Court goes on to say:
“In our view this constituted in effect, a bill of particulars and was, in essence, a declaration to the defendants upon which they were entitled to rely in preparing their defenses, that only such persons as were actually named in the designated experiments would be called upon to defend against the specific items.”
As the Court repeatedly gave evidence during the course of the proceedings that it adhered to this view I did not defend myself, did not need to defend myself and could not defend myself against the accusation that I had participated in the Lost experiments.
Although the Court finds on page 187 of the verdict:
“We think it would be manifestly unfair to the defendant to find him guilty of an offense with which the indictment affirmatively indicated he was not charged,”
it has still found me guilty because of responsibility for the Lost experiment, so that in view of the Court’s own statements as contained in the verdict, my sentence constitutes, insofar as it concerns this matter, a gross injustice.
I believe that the sentence of the Military Tribunal I violates a principle insofar as each defendant must be told clearly what crime he has been charged with, and that he must have opportunity to defend himself against these accusations.
It is this principle that is being violated in the findings of the Court against me. In my opinion, it infringes thus the principle of legal heading laid down in the habeas corpus. It is therefore obviously unjust, according to the wording of the verdict itself.