Q. Well, an assassination is a matter for quick decision. Is it not true, therefore, that all these long preparations that you are telling us about are rather surprising?
A. The following would have to be taken into consideration: Around Himmler and Hitler there was a strong guard, a strong ring of guards, through which none could get unless he was carefully searched and checked. Secondly, and that I already emphasized, one did not have to be quite sure that the generals would carry out that assassination, but one had to be sure that a sufficient number of generals were ready to remove the National Socialist system immediately after the assassination, for the elimination of just these two people would have no political purpose whatsoever. We did not intend to carry out a Putsch but we intended to remove a political system, a political order, and for that reason we had to wait until the situation became right and the generals were ready.
Q. Now, the question crops up whether these plans for the assassination of Hitler and Himmler were only in your fantasy, or the fantasy of your collaborators, or was there any real basis or concrete preparation for such assassination?
A. I already said that the preparations had been worked out in the detailed technical points insofar as the location, the shooting, etc., were concerned.
Q. And who would have assassinated Himmler and Hitler?
A. Sievers was to do that and a few young men belonging to my organization.
Q. And why was it in effect not carried out?
A. After the Stauffenberg assassination had failed, the Wehrmacht circles that came into question were eliminated by Himmler and therefore it was no longer possible to remove that system. The only consequence of any attempted assassination would have been—since the foreign political situation would not have changed—that the people would have said again, “This is the stab in the back for the victorious front line.”
Q. What did Sievers do to further your activity in addition to what you have already said?
A. He, for instance, supported my representative, Arnold Deutelmoser, when he was put on the list of those who were to be removed under the pretext of the assassination which took place in Munich at the Buergerbraeu. He also protected Bomas who was working in the Netherlands. He protected Dr. Schuettelkopf whom we had sent into the RSHA and it was possible for him in turn to send me to Sweden. He saved Niels Bor, Professor Seyb of Oslo University, and he saved a number of Norwegian students, etc.