Reich Minister Funk holds that ruthless raids would entail considerable disturbances in the industries of the non-German territories. The same opinion is held by the Chief of the Military Administration of Italy, State Secretary Dr. Landfried, who believes that the German forces making up the executive body are too weak, and fears that the Italian population would escape seizure in great numbers and flee to uncontrollable areas.

Reich Minister Speer states that he had an interest in both promoting increased labor recruiting for the Reich and maintaining the production in the non-German territories. Up to the present, 25 to 30 percent of the German war production was furnished by the occupied Western territories and Italy, with Italy alone supplying 12½ percent. The Fuehrer had recently decided that this production must be maintained as long as possible, in spite of the difficulties already existing, especially in the field of transportation. The Military Administration, in the opinion of Reich Minister Speer, was easily capable to seize sufficient foreign workers at its present strength, as only a relatively small police force was needed for that purpose. The chief need was for stricter orders, but violent measures or large-scale round-ups were not to be carried out. Rather it would be advisable to proceed gradually with clean methods.

On behalf of the Military Commander in France, Chief of Military Administration Dr. Michel, referred to the statements of State Secretary Dr. Landfried and stated that the situation in France was similar. The calling up of entire age groups was being prepared in France, but had not yet begun as the German military authorities had not yet been able to give their consent. The good will of the highest French authorities could not be doubted, but it was lacking partly at the lower and middle levels. The friendly administrators and individuals willing to work and showing cooperativeness toward the German authorities, exposed themselves to reprisals by the French population.

Ambassador Abetz confirmed these statements. The application of severe measures, such as the shooting of French functionaries, was of no avail. Such a policy only served to drive the population into the Maquis. In these territories, where there were large German armed forces, it would no doubt be possible to obtain a few more ten-thousands of workers. Then these same German forces could be employed in police duty, which would also turn up large numbers of workers. In Paris, the evacuation of which was being considered, 100,000 to 200,000 workers could be seized. In this connection it might be possible to transfer the manpower of entire industries in a body.

The Chief of the Security Police, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, declared himself willing, if asked by the GBA, to place the Security Police at his disposal for this purpose, but pointed out their numerical weakness. For all of France he had only 2,400 men available. It was questionable whether entire age groups could be seized with these feeble forces. In his opinion, the Foreign Office must exercise a stronger influence on the foreign governments.

State Secretary von Steengracht, Foreign Office, commented to the effect that the agreements made with the foreign governments were entirely sufficient. The governments had always been willing, upon requests of the Foreign Office, to issue the necessary orders. If these orders were not carried out, this was due to the inadequate police power of the foreign governments themselves. In France, it had been reduced to a minimum for political reasons. In Italy an executive power was no longer extant. The Foreign Office was willing at any time, he said, to exercise stronger pressure on the foreign governments, but did not expect too much from that. State Secretary von Steengracht asked Ambassador Rahn to comment on this for Italy.

Ambassador Rahn believes that there is still a sufficient number of workers in Italy, so that in theory 1 million could still be taken out, although 2/3 of the Italian territory and population had been lost. He had always been in favor of the system of drafting age classes. This was generally successful until the fall of Rome, as could be seen from the fact that it was possible to seize 200,000 Italians for military service. Since that time the situation in Italy had become extremely difficult, however, as the fall of Rome was an enormous shock to the Italian people. The German authorities had done what they could to neutralize these effects and to that end had merged all executive power in the person of Marshal Graziani. At present, however, the use of violent methods on a large scale was impracticable because it would cause complete disorder and disrupt production. The best example for this is the retaliatory action ordered by the Fuehrer because of the strikes in Turin, when 10 percent of all factory labor forces were to be conscripted because they were shirkers. A force of 4,000 Germans was brought together for that purpose. The result was that the food and power supply of Turin was cut off by the resistance movement so that 250,000 workers had to stop working. This could not be tolerated in view of the substantial contribution of the Italian armament industry to the war effort. Field Marshal Kesselring declared that continuation of forced recruitment would cause not only the loss of the armament production in the upper Italian area, but the loss of the entire theater of war. In the face of this statement the hardiest political will must keep silent. The only thing which could be done was the execution of the forced recruitment in the rebellious area proper. Ambassador Rahn believes the following practical suggestions could be carried out:

a. The recruitment of volunteers is to be continued.

b. To a limited extent, plants are to be transferred to the Reich with machinery and workers.

c. The transfer of wage savings of the Italian workers in Germany to their homeland, which is not functioning well, is to be ensured. For this purpose an automatic procedure is to be introduced which Ambassador Rahn had already proposed in another connection.