“The execution of a death sentence promulgated by a regular court, a special court, or a police court martial, shall take place only when my decision has been issued not to make use of my right to pardon.” (NO-3073, Pros. Ex. 534.)

Thus, even though we assume arguendo, that the experimental subjects had all committed substantial crimes, that they were all properly tried by a duly constituted court of law, and that they were legally sentenced to death, it is still clear from these decrees that these women could not have been legally executed until such time as the Governor General of occupied Poland had decided in each case not to make use of his pardon right. There has been no proof that the Governor General ever acted with respect to pardoning the Polish women used in the experiments, or, for that matter, any substantial number of those not used in the experiments. The only reason these 700 Polish women were transported from Warsaw and Lublin to Ravensbrueck, in the first place, was because the Governor General had not approved their execution. Otherwise they would have been immediately executed in Poland. At the very least, these women were entitled to remain unmolested so long as the Governor General took no action. He may never have acted or, when he did, he may have acted favorably on the pardon. Who is to say that the majority of these 700 women did not live through the war even though they did not undergo the experiments? Certainly it was incumbent on the defense to prove the contrary by a preponderance of the evidence. This it did not do by any evidence.

The defendants Gebhardt, Fischer, and Oberheuser certainly cannot claim that they believed in good faith that the Polish women could have been legally executed. Even the camp doctor, Schiedlausky, knew that the Governor General had to approve each execution. Moreover, the large number of 700 women being sentenced to death at this early stage of the war was enough to put any reasonable person on notice that something was wrong.

Additionally, the uncontroverted evidence proves that survival of the experiments was no guarantee whatever of avoiding execution in any event. At least six of the experimental subjects were proved to have been executed after having survived the experiments. It was not a question of the experiment or execution but rather the experiments and execution. Indeed, in February 1945, an effort was made to execute all of the experimental subjects but, because of confusion in the camp due to the war situation, the experimental subjects were able to obtain different identification numbers and so avoid detection.

But even if one takes the case of the defense at its face value, the Tribunal is in effect asked to rule that it is legal for military doctors of a nation at war to experiment on political prisoners of an occupied country who are condemned to death, to experiment on them in such a way that they may suffer death, excrutiating pain, mutilation, and permanent disability, all this without their consent and in direct aid of the military potential of their enemy. There would, of course, be no valid reason for limiting such a decision to civilian prisoners; the experiments would certainly have been no worse had they been performed on Polish or American prisoners of war. It is impossible to consider seriously this ghoulish ruling being sought for by the defense.

c. Selections from the Argumentation of the Defense

EXTRACT FROM THE CLOSING BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT
KARL BRANDT

The Medical Experiments as Substitute for Penalty[[11]]

The indictment embraces certain medical experiments, which are called war crimes and crimes against humanity. According to paragraphs 10 and 15 of the indictment, these experiments are designated as crimes, as a violation of the general principles of criminal law as evolved from the penal law of all civilized nations, as well as violations of the national penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed. An indication of their punishable character was seen in the fact that the experiments were carried out without the consent of the persons experimented upon.