The most abominable point made by my adversaries is their claim that no executive had been provided within these areas in order to recruit in a sensible manner the Frenchmen, Belgians, and Italians and to dispatch them to work. Thereupon I even proceeded to employ and train a whole batch of French male and female agents who for good pay, just as was done in olden times for “shanghaiing”, went hunting for men and made them drunk by using liquor as well as words in order to dispatch them to Germany. Moreover I charged some able men with founding a special labor supply executive of our own, and this they did by training and arming, with the help of the Higher SS and Police Leader, a number of natives, but I still have to ask the Munitions Ministry for arms for the use of these men. * * *
* * * Especially the protected factories in the occupied countries make my work more difficult. According to reports received within the last days these protected factories are to a great part filled to capacity, and still labor is sucked up into these areas. This strong suction very much obstructs our desire to dispatch labor to the Reich. I wish to emphasize that I never opposed the use of French labor in factories which had been transferred from Germany to France. I am still sound of mind, and as recently as last summer I charged Mr. Hildebrand with an inquiry in France which had the following result: It would be easy to extract from French medium and small factories—80 percent of all French factories are small enterprises with only 36-40 working hours—1 million laborers for use in the transferred factories, and 1 million more for dispatch to Germany. To use 1 million within France should be quite possible unless the protected factories in France artificially suck up the labor completely and unless their number is continually increased, as happens according to my reports especially in Belgium, and unless new categories of works are continually declared protected, so that finally no labor is left which I may use in Germany. I wish here and now to repeat my thesis: A French workman, if treated in the right way, does double the amount of work in Germany that he would do in France, and he has here twice the value he has in France. I want to state clearly and fearlessly—the exaggerated use of the idea of protected factories in connection with the labor supply from France in my submission implies a grave danger for the German labor supply. If we cannot come to the decision that my assistants, together with the armament authorities, are to comb out every factory, this fountain of labor too in the future will remain blocked for the use of Germany, and in this case the program prescribed to me by the Fuehrer may well be frustrated. The same applies to Italy. In either country there are enough laborers, even enough skilled workers; only we must have enough courage to step into the French plants. What really happens in France, I do not know. That a smaller amount of work is done during enemy operations in France, like in every occupied country, than is done in Germany seems to me evident. If I am to fulfill the demands which you present to me, you must be prepared to agree with me and my assistants, that the term “protected factory” is to be restricted in France to what is really necessary and feasible by reasonable men, and the protected factories are not, as the Frenchmen think, protected against any extraction of labor from them for use in Germany. It is indeed very difficult for me to be presented to French eyes as a German of whom they may say, Sauckel is here stopped from acting for German armament! * * * On the other hand, I have grounds for hoping that I shall be just able to wiggle through, first by using my old corps of agents and my labor executive, and secondly by relying upon the measures which I was lucky enough to succeed in obtaining from the French Government. In a discussion lasting 5-6 hours I have exerted from M. Laval the concession that the death penalty will be threatened for officials endeavoring to sabotage the flow of labor supply and certain other measures. Believe me, this was very difficult. It required a hard struggle to get this through. But I succeeded and now in France, Germans ought to take really severe measures, in case the French Government does not do so. Don’t take it amiss, I and my assistants in fact have sometimes seen things happen in France that I was forced to ask, is there no respect any more in France for the German lieutenant with his 10 men. For months every word I spoke was countered by the answer: But what do you mean, Mr. Gauleiter, you know there is no executive at our disposal; we are not able to take action in France! This I have been answered over and over again. How then, am I to regulate the labor supply with regard to France. There is only one solution—the German authorities have to co-operate with each other, and if the Frenchmen despite all their promises do not act, then we Germans must make an example of one case, and, by reason of this law, if necessary put prefect or burgomaster against the wall, if he does not comply with the rules; otherwise no Frenchman at all will be dispatched to Germany. During the latter quarter the belief in a German victory and in all propaganda statements which we were still able to make has sunk below zero, and today it is still the same. I rather expect the new French ministers, especially Henriot [French (Vichy) Minister of Propaganda] will act ruthlessly; they are very willing and I have a good impression of them. The question is only how far they will be able to impress their will on the subordinated authorities. Such is the situation in France.
In Italy the situation is exactly the same, perhaps rather worse. * * *
Moreover, I am offended, and this grieves me most, by the statement that I was responsible for the European partisan nuisance. Even German authorities reproached me thus, although they were the last ones who have the right to make such statements. I wish to protest against this slander, and I can prove that it is not I who is responsible. * * *
* * * Numerous German authorities, even such as had no connections with economics and labor supply, inquired of me, why do you fetch these people to Germany at all? You make trouble for this area and render our existence there more difficult. To which I can only reply: It is my duty to insist on it that labor supply comes from abroad. There is no longer a German labor supply. That the latter is exhausted I already proved by my ill-famed manifesto of April of last year. But I am not able to transfer the German soil to France. Nor can I transfer the German traffic to France nor the German mines. Nor can I transfer the German armament works which still have to release part of their workers, if fit for war service, nor their machines. Here alone 2,500,000 men are in question as has been calculated in the Fuehrer conference. It is the flower of German workers who go to the front and must go there. I have always been one of those who says: If only energetic measures are applied in fetching labor from abroad, then we want to release in God’s name everybody from armaments work whom we can, in order to strengthen our companies. The 1st and 7th Armored Divisions from Thuringia are frequently mentioned in the armed forces report, I can only tell you that the number of soldiers killed in battle in some Thuringian villages has surpassed for some time already the number of soldiers killed in the World War [I] by twice that amount. This I mention in my capacity as Gauleiter. It is for this reason that we have to do our duty. The best kind of German men, and men in the prime of life, have to go to the front, and German women of more than 50 years of age cannot replace them. Therefore I have to continue to go to France, Belgium, Holland, and Italy, and there will be a time again when I shall go to Poland and extract workers there as fit and as many of them as I can get. In this circle I only wish to urge that you spread it around that I am not quite the insane fellow I have been said to be during the last quarter of a year. Even the Fuehrer has been told so. It goes without saying that just this slander has had the effect that I was unable to deliver in the last quarter at least 1½ million workers whom I would have been able to deliver as long ago as last year, had the atmospheric conditions been better. It was due to that “artificial atmospheric screen”, that they did not arrive. I am aware that they simply have to arrive this year. My duty to the Fuehrer, the Reich Marshal, Minister Speer, and towards you, Gentlemen, and to agriculture is apparent, and I shall fulfill it. A start has been made, and as many as 262,000 new workers have arrived, and I hope and am convinced to be able to deliver the bulk of the order. How the labor is to be distributed will then have to be decided according to the needs of the whole of German industry, and I shall always be prepared to keep the closest contact with you, Gentlemen, and to charge the labor exchanges and the district labor exchanges with intimately collaborating with you. Everything is functioning if such collaboration exists. * * *
Milch: * * * I now proceed to the important question, where are we still able to get greater amounts of laborers from you, and without a doubt the answer is, from abroad. I have asked Mr. Schieber to make a short appearance here in order to give his opinion on Italy. I agree with your statement, Gauleiter, that it is only the bad organization of our work abroad which is responsible for the fact that you can’t do your job. Too many people meddle in your work. If someone tells you, there is no executive in France and Italy, I consider it an impudence, a foolish and stupid lie uttered by people who either are unable to think or consciously state an untruth. This kind of person is not interested in giving a clear lead in this respect and in analyzing the situation, probably because they are not smart enough. In this way, however, your work is rendered more difficult or frustrated, and all armament work at the same time. For we have it before our eyes what close relations exist between the situation in the occupied countries and that in the armaments industry. A more foolish policy can hardly be conceived. In case the invasion of France begins and succeeds only to a certain degree, then we shall experience a rising by partisans such as we have never experienced either in the Balkans or in the East, not because this would have happened in any case, but only because we made it possible by not dealing with them in the right manner. Four whole age groups have grown up in France, men between 18 and 23 years of age, who are, therefore, at that age when young people moved by patriotism or seduced by other people are ready to do anything which satisfies their personal hatred against us—and of course they hate us. These men ought to have been called up in age groups and dispatched to Germany; for they present the greatest danger which threatens us in case of invasion. I am firmly convinced and have said several times, if invasion starts, sabotage of all railways, works, and supply bases will be a daily occurrence, and then it will be really the case that our forces are no longer available to survey the execution of our orders within the country, but they will have to fight at the front, thereby leaving in their rear the much more dangerous enemy who destroys their communications, etc. If one had shown the nailed fist and a clear executive intention, a churchyard peace would reign in the rear of the front at the moment the uproar starts. This I have emphasized so frequently, but still nothing is happening, I am afraid. For if one intends to start to shoot at that moment, it will be too late for it; then we have no longer the men at our disposal to kill off the partisans. In the same way, we are aware of the fact that their supply of arms in the West is rather ample since the English are dropping them from planes. I consider it an idiotic statement if you, Gauleiter, are accused of having made these men into partisans. As soon as you arrive the men run away to protect themselves from being sent to Germany. Then they are away, and since they do not know how to exist, they automatically fall into the hands of the partisan leaders; but this is not the consequence of the fact that you wish to fetch them, but of the fact that your opposite number, the executive is not able to prevent their escape. You simply cannot act differently. The main crux of the problem is the fact that your work is made so extremely difficult, and this is why you cannot deliver the 4,050,000 workers. As long as it is feasible for these men to get away and not be caught by the executive, as long as the men are able not to return from leave and not to be found out on the other side, I do not think, Party Comrade Sauckel, that you will have a decisive success through employing your special corps. The men even then will be whisked away unless quite another authority and power is on the watch, and this can only be the army itself. The army alone can exercise effective executive. If some say they cannot do this kind of work, this is incorrect for within France there are training forces stationed in every hole and corner town and every place which could all be used for this work. If this would be done in time, the partisan nuisance would not emerge, just as it would not have done in the East if one had only acted in time. Once I had this task at Stalingrad. At Taganrog there were then 65,000 men of the army, and at the front one lieutenant and 6 men were actually available for each km. and they would have been only too glad if they had 20-30 for their assistance. In the rear there were great masses of men who had retreated in time and squatted down in the villages, and who now were available neither for fighting at the front nor for fighting the partisans. I am aware that I am placing myself in opposition to my own side, but I have seen such things happen everywhere, and can find no remedy but that the army should assert itself ruthlessly. You, Gauleiter Sauckel, the Reich Marshal, and the Central Planning Board ought to report on this question to the Fuehrer, and then he ought to decide at the same time on the duties of the military commanders. There ought to be orders of such lucidity that they could not be misunderstood, and it is then that things will be in order. It never can be too late to do so, but these duties and this work will be more difficult to perform with every passing day. The same applies to Italy as well.
Sauckel: I wish to insist on combing out the protected factories in the future also for the protected factories are working like a suction pump; and since it is known everywhere in Italy and France that every worker if he works in a protected factory is protected against any attempt of mine to extract him, it is only too natural that the men are pouring into these factories. How difficult my task becomes thereby is proved by the following fact. I intended to extract from Italy a million workers within the quarter ending 30 May. Hardly 7,000 arrived in the two months which expired so far. This is indeed the difficulty. The bulk enters the protected factories, and only the chaff remains for my purpose to send them to Germany. At least I hope to accomplish that with regard to larger enterprises as the number of protected factories is restricted in Italy, i.e., the number of protected factories, will not be further increased.