The prohibition of deportation of civilians from occupied territories irrespective of the purpose, as stated in Control Council Law No. 10, is a recognition of the principle of international law that a power in belligerent occupation has no right or authority (title) to deport the citizens of the occupied territories. The separate specification as a war crime in Law No. 10 of ill-treatment of civilians from occupied territories is a recognition of the rule of international law, as heretofore discussed, that even an otherwise lawful deportation (by an authority having title and for a legitimate purpose) is rendered illegal where the deportees are ill-treated.
Without entering into a detailed discussion of the evidence, it should be pointed out at this point, that all these conditions for criminal deportation were abundantly present in the enforced labor program of Germany during the 2d World War, and that the knowing connection of the defendant with all phases of illegal deportation has been established.
Article II (1) (c) of Control Council Law No. 10 specifies certain crimes against humanity. Among these is listed the “deportation * * * (of) any civilian population * * *”. The general language of this sub-section, as applied to deportation, indicates that Control Council Law No. 10 has indeed unconditionally condemned, as a crime against humanity, every instance of the deportation of civilians. Under this sub-section, there would seem to be no room for argument as to the legality of any agreement on the part of any government, legitimate or illegitimate, which allows deportation of its subjects in time of war.
We come now to a consideration of the crime of enslavement. Whereas Article II (b) names deportation to slave labor as a war crime, Article II (1) (c) states that the “enslavement * * * (of) any civilian population” is a crime against humanity. Thus, Law No. 10 treats as separate crimes, and different types of crime, “deportation to slave labor” and “enslavement.”
Article II (b) does not specify as a crime the detention (as distinguished from the deportation) of civilians for use as slave labor or for any other purpose. However, the section does stipulate that any atrocities or offenses against persons which constitute violations of the laws or customs of war, including but not limited to deportation to slave labor, are war crimes. Use or detention of persons from occupied territories for slave labor or for any other purpose, in and of themselves, do constitute violations of the laws and customs of war. Ergo, such use or detention is a war crime within II (1) (b) of Law No. 10.
The crime against humanity which is termed “enslavement” in Article II (1) (c) of Law No. 10 is susceptible of two meanings. It can be understood to embrace the initial act of deprivation of the freedom of another, and an act whereby such deprivation is continued, or either of them, or it may be interpreted as referring only to the initial measures whereby a person is deprived of his freedom.
It is the contention of the prosecution in this case that all phases of the slave labor program, the taking, the transportation, the detention, the use and the inhuman treatment of foreign workers as practiced by the Nazi state and participated in by the defendant, constitute enslavement within the meaning of Article II (1) (c). No sufficient reason appears for the limitation of the crime to the mere initial act. In every true and complete sense a person is enslaved from the moment when his liberty is taken from him until the time when it is restored to him. It is more than probable that if Law No. 10 is intended to limit the crime of enslavement to the initial measures under which a person was deprived of his liberty, there would have been some definite indication, either in the language or in the context of the statute.
Even if we were to concede the narrowest possible meaning for the term “enslavement” in Article II (1) (c), so as to understand by it only the first acts of deprivation of liberty, all acts under which such people were kept in an enslaved status would be crimes against humanity, because the same section defines as such any atrocities and offenses committed against the civilian population. By express proviso “enslavement” and “deportation” are only illustratively mentioned, and “other inhuman acts committed against any civilian population” constitute crimes against humanity.
The result is that whether we adopt the broad interpretation of the term “enslavement” or the narrower one, the deportation, the transportation, the retention, the use and the inhuman treatment of civilian populations are crimes against humanity. The prosecution charges that the defendant was criminally connected with all the phases of the slave labor program, whether these divisions be comprehended within the technical term “enslavement” or be divided between the crime of “enslavement” and that of “other inhuman acts.”
We shall now make brief comment on the subject of the treatment and use of prisoners of war. The Hague and Geneva Conventions merely codify the precepts of the laws and usages of all civilized nations. Article 31 of the Geneva Convention provides that “labor furnished by prisoners of war shall have no direct relation to war operations.” Thus the Convention forbids: