The German nation, before the ascendancy of the NSDAP, had repeatedly recognized the rights of civilians in occupied countries. At the Hague Peace Conference of 1907, an amendment was submitted by the German delegate, Major General von Guendell, which read:
“A belligerent is likewise forbidden to compel the nationals of the adverse party to take part in the operations of war directed against their country, even when they have been in his service before the commencement of the war.”
The German manual for war on land (Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege, Edition 1902) stated:
“The inhabitants of an invaded territory are persons endowed with rights * * * subject to certain restrictions * * * but who otherwise may live free from vexations and, as in time of peace, under the protection of the laws.”
During the First World War, an order of the German Supreme Command (3 October 1916) provided for the deportation of Belgian vagrants and idlers to Germany for work, but specified that such labor was not to be used in connection with operations of war. The order resulted in such a storm of protest that it was at once abandoned by the German authorities.
It cannot be contended, of course, that foreign workers were entitled to comforts or luxuries which were not accorded German workers. It is also recognized that, especially during the latter part of the war there was a universal shortage of food and fuel throughout the Reich and in the discomforts arising therefrom foreign workers were bound to share. But it is an undoubted fact that the foreign workers were subjected to cruelties and torture and the deprivation of decent human rights merely because they were aliens. This was not true in isolated instances, but was universal and was the working out of the German attitude toward those whom it considered inferior peoples. If any decent human consideration was shown these workers, it was merely to maintain their productivity and did not stem from any humanitarian considerations.
The Tribunal therefore finds the defendant guilty of the war crimes charged in count one of the indictment, to wit, that he was a principal in, accessory to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in and was connected with, plans and enterprises involving slave labor and deportation to slave labor of the civilian populations of countries and territories occupied by the German armed forces, and in the enslavement, deportation, ill-treatment and terrorization of such persons; and further that the defendant was a principal in, accessory to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and was connected with, plans and enterprises involving the use of prisoners of war in war operations and work having a direct relation to war operations.
COUNT THREE
Count three of the indictment charges the defendant with crimes against humanity committed against “German nationals and nationals of other countries.” Sufficient proof was not adduced as to such offenses against German nationals to justify an adjudication of guilt on that ground. As to such crimes against nationals of other countries, the evidence shows that a large number of Hungarian Jews and other nationals of Hungary and Romania, which countries were occupied by Germany but were not belligerents, were subjected to the same tortures and deportations as were the nationals of Poland and Russia. In count one of the indictment these acts are charged as war crimes and have heretofore been considered by the Tribunal under that count in this judgment. In the judgment of the International Military Tribunal (Vol. I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 254), the court stated—
“From the beginning of the war in 1939, war crimes were committed on a vast scale which were also crimes against humanity.”