In the December number of Universal Brotherhood the question is asked: “Whence arises the sense of duty? In what does it originate?” The answers given are good; and V. F. touches the key-note in the words “he owes it to himself,” etc.
The question and the discussions recalled to my mind the answer given to the same question by Dr. Hickok of Union College in his treatise on Moral Science, which was published in 1853, and used as a text-book in the University of Vermont a few years later.
It is too often taken for granted that a Christian must find a new basis of ethics and a new rule of right in order to justify his acceptance of the Theosophical teachings. This is far from the case, even assuming for the sake of the argument what is not true in fact, that theosophy rejects the Bible; for the great majority of Christian writers on this subject have not founded their systems on the Bible, or upon any religious system whatever, but have, so far as they discuss religious duties, treated them as a part of some greater ethical whole. Such is the case in the manual of Dr. Hickok. He only needs to bring out more clearly the unity of finite spirits in Absolute Spirit, and to note the proper distinction between personality and individuality and between individuality and the One Life—a distinction that is logical rather than metaphysical—and to enlarge his view so as to include the tenet of reincarnation with its correlative doctrines, to make his system very good Theosophy. His foundation is impregnable; but by overlooking the unity of the finite in the infinite, and by clinging to the notion of a personal God distinct from the Higher Self, he brings that God into judgment before the finite spirit of man. This makes the Second Part of his treatise, on Divine Government, weak and halting in comparison with the First Part, on Pure Morality. His work would have been simplified and strengthened beyond measure could he have seen that the self before whom man stands in the inner sanctuary of his being is the Higher Self of our teachings, and is one with the highest Deity. I quote Dr. Hickok’s statement of the basis of ethics and of the source of our sense of duty.
“Whether absolute or finite spirit, there is to each an inner world of conscious prerogative—revealed to itself completely, and to itself only, except as the absolute includes the finite—and from which comes forth perpetually the imperative, that every action be restrained by that which is due to its own dignity. It is this consciousness of the intrinsic excellency of spiritual being, which awakens the reverence that every man is forced to feel when he is brought fairly to stand alone in the presence of his own spirit. As if another and a divine self scanned and judged every purpose and thought of the acting self, so is every man when arraigned before his own personality, and made to hear with uncovered head his sentence of self-justification or self-condemnation. There is an awful sanctuary in every immortal spirit, and man needs nothing more than to exclude all else, and stand alone before himself, to be made conscious of an authority he can neither dethrone nor delude. From its approbation comes self-respect; from its disapprobation, self-contempt. A stern behest is ever upon him, that he do nothing to degrade the real dignity of his spiritual being. He is a law to himself, and has both the judge and executioner within him and inseparable from him. The claim of this intrinsic excellency of spiritual being, as apprehended by the reason may be known as the objective Rule of right.
“We may call this the imperative of reason, the constraint of conscience, or the voice of God within him; but by whatever terms expressed, the real meaning will be, that every man has consciously the bond upon him to do that, and that only, which is due to his spiritual excellency. The motive to this is not any gratification of a want, not any satisfying of a craving, and thus to be done for a price in happiness; but it is solely that he may be just what the intrinsic excellency of his own spirit demands that he should be. Enough for him, that he is, in the sight of his own spirit, and of all spirits, worthy of spiritual approbation. Not only would he not sell this worthiness of character for any price, but he has not attained it for the sake of a reward beyond it. That it was not the end, but a means to a further end, would make it wholly mercenary, and the very worthiness he speaks of would be profaned to a marketable commodity. He willingly then would be anything else if he could get equal wages for it. To be thus worthy of spiritual approbation is the attainment of the highest dignity, and may be called the subjective end of ethics, and is a moral good.
“This is the ultimate end of rational being; the end of all ends. As worthy of happiness, this may now righteously be given, and righteously taken, but not righteously paid as a price nor claimed as wages. The good is the being worthy, not that he is to get something for it. The highest good—the SUMMUM BONUM—is worthiness of spiritual approbation.”
The italics and capitals are Dr. Hickok’s. “As if another and a divine self scanned and judged every purpose and thought of the acting self,” could hardly be improved by any of our theosophical writers.
G. A. Marshall.
Darlington, Wis., Dec. 29, 1898.