Why Mr. Bryan Can Never Be President
In 1896, it cost the Republicans six million dollars to defeat Bryan; in 1900, it cost them four millions; in 1908, they “beat him to a frazzle” with less than two millions.
In 1896, every chance was in his favor; he was young, handsome, magnetic, eloquent, without a stain on his record. In the general enthusiasm aroused by his “crown-of-thorns, cross-of-gold” speech, people did not give heed to the craftiness and selfishness of the Bland delegate who used Bland’s name as a stalking horse to get the nomination for himself. For twenty years Richard P. Bland had labored for Bi-metallism. He had won the fight by sheer bulldog pluck. The Bland-Allison act of 1878 was a Bland triumph. The Sherman law of 1890 was a Bland victory, for Sherman himself said it must be passed to head off a free-coinage act. When the Congress of 1892 convened, the Bland forces had an overwhelming majority. Why then could we not make a law restoring the white metal to its constitutional place as the equal of gold? Because, in the contest for the Speakership, the Northern Congressmen got control of the Committees as an exchange for the office of Speaker.
But the tide of public feeling in favor of “Constitutional money” kept on rising, and there is no doubt whatever that a majority of our people in 1896, favored Bi-metallism. But Bryan, cunning and ambitious, used his opportunities as a Bland delegate to undermine Bland, and at the psychological moment treated Bland to what Garfield had treated Sherman.
What had Bryan done for Bi-metallism? Nothing. He did not even understand the true meaning of it. As for Bland, he had fought the battle of “Constitutional money” while Bryan was at school, and when, in the hour of Silver’s triumph, the hero of its struggle was cast aside by his ungrateful party, it broke the old man’s heart and he died.
When I think of the long series of years during which Mr. Bland was the unflinching, untiring leader of the forces of Bi-metallism, and when I think of the very substantial fruits of his labors, the manner in which Bryan and the Democratic party flung him aside—the old horse turned out to graze till he should drop—seems to me to be one of the most convincing illustrations of the fact that “politics is hell.”
Having captured the Democratic nomination, Bryan turned his attention to the Populists. They had proved that they could poll nearly two million votes. Bryan wanted them. Through Allen of Nebraska and Jones of Arkansas he laid his plans to get them. By as foul a trick as ever was played in American politics, the Populist Convention was inveigled into giving its Presidential nomination to Bryan. Having got what he sought, he broke the contract, turned a deaf ear to all appeals, underrated the measure of Mid-road Populist resentment, invaded “the enemy’s country,” cherished the delusion that he could win New England, hung on to the impossible Sewall, and so lost the Presidency.
It is a fact that the Republicans had no hope of success, after the action of the Populist Convention, until Bryan himself adopted the insane policy of making the race with two Vice-Presidential candidates swinging on to the ticket.